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Abstract
The long-lasting problems of the Czech economy, which have become apparent
since 1996, have their roots in the behavior of a significant part of the domestic
enterprise sector. These problems were called into being by a very intensive,
nevertheless deeply non-standard mass privatization. The authentic (generic) private
sector cannot be based on a command coming from the upper hierarchies of the social
organization. It can arise only from gradual acts at the level of economic agents making
their decisions autonomously at the grass roots of the economy. Soft market
environment set by the Czech mass privatization policies was counter-productive for the
development of entrepreneurial activities as defined by Schumpeter. The lobbies of
pressure groups, defending the privileges of former socialist corporations, became
dominant in shaping Czech politics, fiscal and banking economic policies and the build-
up of economic institutions. The authentic private sector that evolved mainly from small
and medium-sized enterprises was driven from its start to a position of an outsider.
Notwithstanding the lack of government support, market imperfections,
bureaucracy and failing judiciary, the sector of newly established businesses has shown
a high degree of viability and at the end of the 1990s it became a dominant player on the
market side of the Czech economy. The future of the Czech economic development
cannot be separated from the situation in both the enterprises under foreign ownership
and the small and medium-sized firms under indigenous owners. The economic policy-
making should be based on these facts and provide for the requirements of these two
progressive segments of the Czech authentic private sector. This also implies that merits
of mass privatization should be subject to a fundamental overhauling on both the
academic and the economic policy sides.
JEL classification numbers: D73, L33, M13, O17, P26
Keywords: privatization, private sector, entrepreneurship, restructuring, economic
transition.
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Foreword
This study is a part of a larger project whose aim was to analyze “The new
entrepreneurial private sector in more advanced transition economies of Poland,
Czechia and Hungary”. The work on this paper commenced while the author was not
associated with IIASA. The authors of the remaining two country studies were Jan
Winiecki from Europa-Universitaet Viadrina in Frankfurt (Oder) and Mihaly Laki from
Economic Institute of Hungarian Academy of Sciences in Budapest.
Even though the rise of new entrepreneurial class and their newly founded
businesses are at the forefront of transition, paradoxically they received only marginal
attention both from the economic research and the policy-making. The dynamic, newly
established private firms (so-called generic or de novo private sector) therefore
developed sideways behind the bulk of attention given to privatized state-owned
enterprises. The research in this paper had to cope not only with the lack of data about
newly established firms but also it had to establish a theoretical framework which would
allow to describe the differences in behavior and performance of the new generic sector
from the old privatized sector.
The structure of the study is methodologically based on an approach following
from abstract principles to concrete phenomena encountered in the Czech economy and
ending with empirical evidence and data:
• Philosophy of privatization and evolution of the private sector
• Roles of the generic private sector in a national economy and its relationship to
small and medium enterprises
• Evolution of Czech transition and its policies for the development of private
ownership
• Alternatives to mass methods of privatization – gradual evolution of the private
sector “from below”
• Empirical evidence about the performance of Czech de novo private enterprises
• Institutional barriers to new entrepreneurial private sector in Czechia
• Supplements explaining the theoretical inferences, data, tables and figures with own
empirical findings and an overview of empirical material from other studies of the
generic private sector.
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1.  The Philosophy of Privatization
It is now a generally accepted fact that private ownership of capital for
producing private goods is more efficient than the public ownership because it has
superior incentives for governance, decision-making, risk bearing, competition and
innovation. The private capitalist ownership in advanced market economies was borne
in a gradual evolutionary process, lasting in many countries over 150 years, subjecting
the owners and efficiency in their firms to long-lasting tests of viability that became an
undisputed standard of their performance and environment. On the other hand, the
private ownership in transition economies was created by a “privatization shock” and
the selection of both owners and the property privatized was to a large extent random.
There were borne various types of “private owners” whose motives and incentives for
the usage of capital became extremely varied and in many ways incompatible with the
behavior of standard private owners. Not surprisingly, there are many ambiguities in the
process of privatization (Frydman, Rapaczynski, 1994) leading to a conclusion that “…
the concept of privatization … obscures important cress-sectional variations, since the
performance effects of ownership transformations are significantly different depending
on the type of owners to whom control is given during the privatization process”
(Frydman, Gray, Hessel, Rapaczynski, 1999, p.  1154).
In order to find workable analytical concepts, we should turn to definitions of
two typologies of the evolution of the private sector: from “above” and from “below”,
as utilized by Gruszecki and Winiecki, 1991, and Winiecki, 2000. The first of these two
methods is based on turning existing state-owned enterprises (SOEs) into private
hands, for the achievement of which the activism of the government and its state
hierarchies is paramount. The alternative approach to the rise of the private sector leads
through the establishment of the authentic (“genuine” or “generic”) private sector by
the creation and expansion of “de novo” private firms. In the strategy “from below”
the mainstream of activism comes from the grass roots of the economy, i.e. at the
autonomous firm level and the activism of their owners. The difference between the two
concepts rests in the difference between the de iure and the de facto meaning of
“privatization”. The idea is embedded in the tradition of German philosophy, saying that
there may be crucial differences between the external phenomena (form, appearance and
labeling) and the intrinsic real contents of “privatization”.
2This whole problem has also deep roots in the economic literature. Hayek, 1973,
came up with a supposition that all functioning economic systems must be based on a
concept of “order”. He distinguished two sources of order: Cosmos and Taxis. The
former is given exogenously (i.e. spontaneously) and is represented, among others, by
free markets, informal rules and behavioral patterns. The latter is created artificially,
reflecting the aims (i.e. the vested interests) of certain social groups. Taxis is
represented by organizations, their hierarchies and institutions. Hayek claims that it is
impossible to introduce a new order by force - by manipulating Taxis. We can use
Hayek’s reasoning and argue that mass privatization was an attempt to introduce a new
economic order unilaterally by mere decree, while Cosmos was still not tuned that way
and even the remaining parts of Taxis were still reflecting a different stage of evolution.
The inertia of path dependency is another approach to the same thing.
A hasty and superficial mass privatization thus could cause a “crowding-out” in
the natural processes evolving from Cosmos and even choke the self-sustaining
processes of privatization and reallocation of resources. The development of small- and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) could have been one of them, repressed by an
ordained bias of the society towards mere redistribution of some formal ownership
entitlements (usus or usus fructus), while neglecting the crucial importance of
governance (abusus). If we accept Hayek’s methodology of development and order, then
we must conclude that the Czech “conservative” approach to privatization was to a
large extent a result of misunderstanding and/or a direct abuse of his ideas.
The criterion for privatization should rest in the behavior of the owners as its
actors. While the privatization “from below” is consistent with the principles of
microeconomics (i.e. the autonomous decision-making of individual economic agents
that is their own cause), the privatization “from above” is normative and exogenous to
these actors. The processes that are so triggered from the top hierarchy of the social
intervention have difficulties in transcending its form of being mere legal acts. The form
becomes so dominant that the contents of privatization (i.e. restructuring and
competition) remain entangled in the virtual reality of bureaucracy, into which the acts
of privatization were borne. While one of the crucial reasons for privatization is to make
the owners sensitive to competition and restructuring (Brown and Earle, 2001), the
“nominal” privatization from above may miss this point because the new virtual owners
may not be motivated in restructuring and using the existing assets efficiently since their
interest can be oriented to very different domains. For example, it may be acquiring
debts, asset stripping and private consumption.
The dual classifications presented above are also in line with approaches to
transformation strategies by other scholars. For example, Kornai, 1989, distinguished
between strategy A of an “organic development” and a strategy B of “shock therapy” by
speedy privatization. In Kornai, 2000, these strategies were again assessed with a
perspective of 10 years and it was concluded that the role of strategy A in the
transformation of former Comecon countries was generally less important. The opposite
was true for China. Similarly Sato, 1995 and 2000, distinguishes between two strategies
where the first one is evolutionary (gradual), concerned with corporate governance, low
cost and SME development. The other strategy is biased towards an “ownership
obsession” and attempts to swiftly transform the state-owned corporate sector by giving
3it a label of a different legal group. While the former slow strategy has a higher chance
of succeeding in qualitative economic terms (while political activism remains subdued),
the latter strategy was more preferred by political parties and led to deeper political
reforms (while the economic transformation did not bring a breakthrough in the growth
of output).
A similar idea was proposed in the Czech literature. Mlcoch, 2000, concluded
his long-lasting study with a general observation that a speedy (i.e. shock) mass
privatization in European post-Communist countries created a conflict with the inherited
institutional arrangements from perversely functioning markets under central planning.
The failure to introduce performing markets and the enforcement of property rights
caused a reversal in the process of transformation which got stalled in the conflicts of
interest between owners, quasi-owners and various powerful agents. Mlcoch proposed a
gradually evolving privatization strategy, which would follow the slower speed of
accommodating transformation of economic institutions.
A very important message in this respect came from the World Bank (Selowsky,
Mitra et al., 2001. A large part of its assessment of experiences from the 10 years of
transition is devoted to the de novo firms. The emergence of new firms, especially as
“green field” start-ups, is taken there as the quintessence feature of transition. It is
directly juxtaposed to the privatization of existing state corporations. The authors derive
from the theory of governance, what they also empirically confirm, that de novo firms
are more efficient than the privatized giants and their role is to be engines of growth,
together with the enterprises established by means of FDI. These firms will grow as the
spin-offs from contracting segments of the economy. One should not have doubts that in
the Czech case, where the majority of state-owned firms were transformed into non-
state (quasi-private) hands by mass privatization schemes, it is these privatized
companies, which represent the shrinking sector and which have revealed during 1992-
99 a syndrome of a low immunity to competition.
It is also discussed in the World Bank Report that governments are very often
inclined to apply adverse policies in order to keep the former SOEs alive. Instead of
standing by the policies defending market discipline (hard budget constraint, pro-
investment climate and competition) and encouraging the agents to enter and sustain
their development on such a path, the governments protect the old enterprises, levy high
taxes on successful firms, build investment barriers and engage in anti-competitive
practices. In Appendix B we show and discuss some of the evidence provided by the
World Bank study. Though in its theoretical stance for discussing the new and the old
enterprises the World Bank study is not referring to hierarchies (i.e. “from above”
versus “form below”), the implicit principles of its methodology are compatible with
our approach.
Even though it is not disputed that both of our strategies must be absolutely
exclusive (i.e. they cannot run in parallel), once the act of transformation became a top
national priority, the issue of economic long-term development rests on the proviso
which one of these two strategies dominates 1. In another words, development is
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 It is characteristic for human organizations that they may be ruled by a marginal majority (e.g.
with 51% of votes). It is a rare exception that the governance is subject to rules requiring a
proportional representation of interests. It is even more characteristic that the decision-making
4determined by the spin-offs that the dominant approach to privatization generates:
such as the institutions (e.g. legislation), the economic policies, the market
organization and the ethics guarding the rules of the game 2.
Once the alternative approaches to privatization exist as a trade-off, and once
their demands on institutions, economic policies, competition and ethics are at conflict,
there must be present an onslaught for dominance between vested interests at the
political level. The winning slogan of the 1992 Czech polls was the “voucher
privatization”. The Czech way to capitalism was therefore forged by the opportunism
offered by this experimental scheme. Its impact on both the strategic and the operative
issues was crucial and its time horizon should be expected to span over a very long
period. Late in this study we will analyze what the motives were and the outcomes of
that particular privatization strategy. In line with Winiecki, 2001, we may conclude that
both high and low Czech politics paid for long little attention to the far-reaching
consequences that alternative privatization policies could bring about. The belief that
“privatization” has only one contents was reflected in practically no concern about the
existence and the conditions for the development of generic private sector.
There is another aspect of privatization that is associated with game theory.
While the functioning of markets and institutions is based on repetitions, i.e. on repeated
games (supergames), privatization is by its nature a game that is unique and not
repeated. While it is the property of repeated games that its agents learn, co-operate and
finally achieve optimal allocations of the whole system, a one-time game lacks co-
ordination and learning, and leads to antagonistic individual strategies. Its natural result
ends up in so called “prisoner’s dilemma” that is notoriously sub-optimal. Therefore a
privatization aiming at speed, massive one-time transfers and a lack of competitive
bidding 3 can acquire the properties of a single game and can lead to a hysteresis that
will adversely influence the allocation of resources for a long time.
The game-theoretic aspects of privatization come out from its risks and
uncertainty. The privatized property is so unique and complex that it is difficult to
assess its market value. The information abounds with asymmetries and the validity of
any information can be easily reversed because it is subject to changing institutional
environment. As is known from the markets for “lemons”, the average purchasing price
should be expected to be undervalued. However, some bidders can buy more than the
property itself – e.g. the access to government subsidy, bank loan and prestige – and
                                                                                                                                              
and passing of laws is under control of a well-organized minority representation. Privatization in
transition is such a dominant feature for the social behavior that that its dominant strategy and
its dominant pressure groups rule the whole society.
2
 This is again in line with the main topic of the last study by M. Olson, 1998, where he inquires
the causes of the wealth of nations. “So what is it that makes some market economies rich while
other market economies are poor? What policies and institutions does a country need to
change from a market economy of peddlers and bazaars to a market economy that generates a
cornucopia of riches”? (p. iii) We may add that the same must be added to the notion of a
“private entrepreneurship” that may differ enormously in its economic contents between various
practically existing forms.
3
 One of the most infamous principles of Czech privatization was the slogan of “switched off
lights” (i.e. privatization without legal rules) that was officially accepted as a means of speeding
up property transfers.
5they can bid the price much higher. Ideally, privatization can be considered a
speculation on future asset price increase. That would be reflected by a scheme:
Low purchasing price → restructuring → investment → high profits → asset
appreciation → high selling price (e.g. to a foreign investor).
However, the opposite strategy can become a reality, as the speculation can
turn to a future asset price decrease. Then the scheme would look as follows:
Too high purchasing price → no restructuring → asset stripping → high losses →
indebtedness → asset depreciation → bankruptcy.
The quality of privatization and the legal liabilities of the governance do matter.
The mass privatization techniques are so superficial in these aspects that they are not
able to introduce an institutional environment that would guarantee perfect contract
enforcement and exclude the moral hazard accompanied by imperfect contracts from
becoming the salient features of their schemes.
2. Authentic Private Sector and SMEs
Let us turn now to the problem how the authentic (de novo) private sector
evolves at the level of indigenous (domestically owned) firms in a country undergoing
transition. We cannot expect that such new firms will be large firms because the lack of
financial capital of households is a characteristic feature of transition economies.
Therefore we should draw our attention to small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs).
The economic statistics of the OECD countries for the last 20 years show that
the role of SMEs has retained its important position in the world in spite of a rapid
ascent of multinational corporations (MNCs). Since 1986 there was even observed a
trend in the economies of EU that the share of SMEs on total employment was rising.
SMEs may not only provide employment to the majority of work force but they may be
in many developed countries the most important net provider of new jobs. The network
of SMEs, functioning as flexible and efficient suppliers of semi-finished products and
services to big firms, has been also an essential factor behind the competitiveness of the
OECD member countries on world markets. It is becoming accepted that there is a
“division of labor” between the large and the small business sectors. This can be
generalized into a hypothesis that the sectors of large and the small businesses have a
different role in modern market economies. Their role should be judged from two
different points of views in respect to:
• the competition between them inside the same industry;
• the complementarity of their functions.
As to the former, the competition on globalized world markets is subject to
dominant roles of MNCs and large domestic companies. The relationship between them
is theoretically explained by oligopolistic Cournot or Bertrand adjustments of prices and
market shares. The functioning of such imperfect economies can be, however, Pareto-
improved if some fringe (outsider) competitors pose a potential threat to collusive
behavior of dominant firms. The mechanism of fringe competition from the side of
SMEs and the functioning of the EU competition policies are discussed by Pelkmans,
1997. Its principles are explained in more detail in Appendix A.
6As to the complementarity, the interaction between large and smaller firms can
be explained by economies to scale. In some production lines the technologies can be
effectively applied even at a family-firm scale. The advances in electronics and the
expanding share of services on GDP opened new potential for SMEs. In difference to
traditional domains of SMEs (such as in agriculture, clothing, wood-working or
construction), which were labor intensive, the modern domains (such as
semiconductors, electronic design and testing, applied science, information, specific
chemistry, healthcare, etc.), are generally capital and human-capital intensive.
As it was first extensively documented in Silicon Valley, SMEs can even build
on economies to scale that are external to the firm (Saxenian, 1994, or Porter, 1990).
The mutually interlinked Figures 1a and 1b explain how such an evolutionary process
can be explained. The upper part of the figure depicts the situation in the whole
semiconductor industry that consists of a cluster of many SMEs. In the lower part the
situation of one small firm is described. First the equilibrium is in points A and A’.
Then the demand for semiconductors rises from D1 to D2 what is seen in the firms as a
shift from d1 to d2. Thus the price will increase to P1’, what will increase the production
to Q1’ and q1’ at the level of firm, respectively.
The expanding demand is an incentive to invest and apply R&D into improving
the technology. Except for R&D there are other factors that decrease the costs and shift
the supply curve downwards. They are associated with externalities and spillovers
(Krugman, Obstfeld, 1997, p. 147, especially if the firms are geographically
concentrated and information technologies are in the core of innovation. The
“agglomeration effects”, causing the decrease of the short-run marginal cost (and thus
the average cost) in time, can be traced to the existence of networks of specialized
suppliers of inputs, equipment and design, labor market and human capital pooling, and
knowledge spillovers. Taken as a development in time, we can estimate a long-run
average curve that has all properties of increasing returns to scale, notwithstanding that
the industry’s supply curve is always upward sloping.
Another argument supporting the complementary existence of SMEs and large
firms is the dependence of large companies on flexible supplies (so called “backward
links”) that are acquired by outsourcing. It was confirmed recently that the importance
of spillovers and networks has become a crucial condition for a growing and high-wage
economy. The spillovers are usually directed from large firms (e.g. MNCs coming as
foreign direct investment - see Blomström and Kokko, 1994) into indigenous firms,
many of them SMEs. On the other hand, it is required that the indigenous firms do not
lag too much in technologies, R&D and human capital behind MNCs.
To conclude, we can make a supposition that a high growth of a modern
economy requires the existence of the following conditions:
• A balanced division of labor between large firms and SMEs;
• A competitive environment where SMEs, as fringe competitors, play an
irreplaceable role in cutting the rents of colluded oligopolies;
• A contestable environment where SMEs have a chance to gain the market share of
firms with market power;
7Figure 1a: External Scale Economies: Situation in the whole industry with many
small competitive firms
Figure 1b: Situation in one particular small firm out of a set of many firms from the
previous figure.
8• An institutional environment that precludes the existence of barriers to the
development of SMEs – such as the burden of bureaucracy, over-regulation and its
high transaction costs;
• An institutional environment that supports the smooth and non-discriminatory
functioning of:
*   markets – such as capital markets, banking and insurance;
* R&D;
* supply of skilled labor and human capital;
*  provision of public goods and public procurement;
*  infrastructure – especially concerning the public information, legislation and the
    judiciary system.
3.  The Czech Economy under Central Planning and throughout
the 1990s
It is very important to commence with a remark that the small firms in former
Communist centrally planned economies played a marginal role. In some countries, like
in the Soviet Union, an even negligible role. Czechoslovakia of 1989 was in that respect
one of the laggards, having a tiny 1.5% share of the private sector on GDP (practically
all of it self-employed businesses). That was a serious drawback for a start of
transformation, in regard to the advantages of some other transition countries. The share
of private SMEs on GDP was at that time 8.5% in Eastern Germany, 14% in Hungary
and 26% in Poland (Janacek, 2000). The last two mentioned had also an advantage in
larger openness to the West, both cultural and economic.
In Czechia prior to 1948, however, the SMEs played a very important role, since
the SMEs were highly developed outside the agricultural sector – in industries such as
textile, clothing, food, mechanical machinery and financial services. Though the large
and medium firms were nationalized already in 1945, the small firms were nationalized
only during 1948-1956. The institutional economics put an important weight to the
concept of “path dependency”. It is believed that the past experience with industrial
organization, competition, industrial structure, objective functions and incentive
schemes determines the future behavioral patterns of firms. It was argued in Czechia
during 1990-91 that the entrepreneurial culture of SMEs prior to 1949 was forgotten and
that the dominant behavior was that of large enterprises controlled by the Communist
Party. That was the reason why privatization schemes supporting SMEs (such as
auctions of small plants and real estates suitable for SMEs and restitutions) were
not given priority and high expectations were associated with mass privatization
schemes.
The transition in Central and East European countries (CEECs) has become a
cyclical process. Their growth was challenged by new crises following their recovery
from the initial production downfall. The majority of these countries did not recover the
levels of GDP before the transition commenced even after 10 years of adjustments. It
became evident that the role of SMEs could be much more important for the
development of these societies than was originally supposed. Then it was realized that
the experience of OECD countries and of some NICs should be taken into account. The
emergence of a strong SME sector could thus act as a catalyst for the rise of
9competitiveness in the remaining yet not restructured sectors of the economy – former
state-owned enterprises and the public sector. It could even increase the efficiency of
the large international corporations. The positive externalities, that could be generated
by SMEs and passed into the economic, political and social environment, have hardly
other substitutes.
Unfortunately, Czech new businesses could not have played the pioneering role
in entrepreneurship. The policy of transformation, adopted already in 1990-91, shunned
them to a sideline. Czech privatization strategy crowded out the space of maneuvering
for any new businesses. In order to understand the role and the position of authentic
private sector in the Czech economy we have to explain how the process of transition
was evolving and what policies caused that the massive spontaneous emergence of new
businesses could not become the engine of Czech growth.
Though the Czech transition was often quoted during the period 1992-96 as an
example to be followed internationally, its unexpected economic languor during 1996-
1999 unveiled the shaky foundations stemming from the domination of the economy by
large former SOEs. The severe Czech recession, after a period of seemingly inexorable
stabilization (1993-95), was quite unexpected, as was also the peculiar “Czech way”
preceding it. Nevertheless, similar problems, rebounding on the whole economy
(although at a minor scale), can be observed in all economies of transition (Poeschl,
2000). The policy of putting too much stress on transforming the large firms, while
neglecting the sector of authentic small and medium firms, can be very myopic, as the
Czech experience can show. This is a statement of a fundamental importance for the
policies of economic transformation in any post-Communist country. The role of SMEs
was also underestimated in the set of policies recommended by advisors of IMF and the
World Bank in the so-called “Washington consensus” 4. If the stabilizing functions of
SMEs at the grass roots of an economy of transition would be of a universal nature, our
study could point to an underlying building block underpinning the policy of economic
transformation. Let us therefore commence with the description of the Czech
developments in the past 10 years of transition.
The Czech political scene since 1990 until 1998 was dominated by liberal pro-
market parties. In the period 1992-97 it was the conservative party of Civic Democrats
(ODS). Unfortunately, after the partitioning of Czechoslovakia in 1993, the practice of
liberalism got under a severe pressure from the vested interests. The strongest lobby
came from the beneficiaries of privatization. There was a paradox present in politics
after 1992: the more the real policies departed from the free market model 5, the more
                                                
4
 The Washington consensus was a set of rules, associated with the recommendations of the
IMF and the World Bank to the countries of transition that stressed the importance of
macroeconomic stabilization, liberalization and privatization. Though these policies are
definitely necessary, they are not sufficient for a long-term recovery if the microeconomic and
the institutional conditions for restructuring have not developed satisfactorily. It is argued in this
paper that SMEs play a pivotal role for the sustainability of those conditions. It fact it is the
SMEs that give the microeconomic and institutional conditions its meaning.
5
 The most characteristic feature of policies in the period 1993-97 was their discretionary
character and a lack of general rules. It was accompanied by nearly non-existent property rights
enforcement, “shaded lights” for privatization, bias to support large privatized businesses, easy
money provided by banks intentionally left unprivatized and corruption of political parties.
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pro-liberal sounded the rhetoric of political proclamations. With the Social Democrats
entering the government in 1998 the recession was already mounting. Though first very
slowly, the real policies of the Social Democrats were moving, in some aspects, more to
the liberal side than what was seen in the previous 5 years. Albeit it was generally
accepted by nearly all analysts that the Czech approach to transition failed, there
remained a wide dispute about the alternatives. Some parties affirmed that the recession
was caused exclusively by restrictive monetary policies of the independent Czech
National Bank, once the external balance in 1996 was dashing to an unsustainable
disequilibrium. The view in this paper on this matter is fundamentally different. The
whole problem had deeper roots than a mere liquidity crisis. The Czech economic
crisis evolved as an outcome of the highly unorthodox way how the privatization
strategy was conceived and implemented.
4.  The Nature of Czech Privatization “From Above”
The main attraction of the voucher privatization rests on a very enticing and
simple idea of becoming rich by mere decree 6. Quite surprisingly, there was not a
public demand for such a move in the Czech society even at the beginning of 1992. The
people were prepared for a toil and belt-tightening when one of the newly established
parties came with its proposal. It became its winning slogan for the June 1992 elections.
The “instant capitalism” offered by vouchers was later extended into a slogan of a
“Czech way”. Under its auspices, foreign direct investment was turned down –
becoming a marginal factor in the whole privatization strategy. Indeed, until 1997 the
FDI acquisitions comprised a mere $ 6 billion (168 billion CZK) or 17% of all property
privatized (964 billion CZK by June 30th, 1997), while the total value of all productive
physical assets was 1600 billion CZK at their 1990 book value. Another 3% of assets
were privatized under competitive bidding of small-scale public auctions and 7% were
left for restitutions. On the other hand, 35% of the total property officially privatized
went through a voucher give-away scheme and 5% were donated to municipalities. The
remaining 33% were given away by “direct sales” (i.e. by sales to hand-picked
exclusive beneficiaries), managerial buy-outs or by domestic tenders (i.e. closed
envelope bidding) 7.
If, by following the above classification, we set apart domestic and foreign
competitive sales and restitutions, then remaining 73% of all property privatized fell
into the category of mass-privatization schemes. These schemes suffered of
intransparency and their aims were not motivated primarily by restructuring, what was
discovered unfortunately much later. One should also remember that 40% of all
                                                
6
 In a very similar political style, but in an inverse direction, it was the policy of nationalization
that brought the Czechoslovak Communists nearly 40% of votes in 1946 and a silent public
support in 1948 when the democracy was dismantled. The idea was that a mere change of
property could increase the productivity and bring the economy on a growth path. Though the
official average growth rate of the Czechoslovak economy during 1948-1989 was around 4%,
the real growth is estimated in the brackets of 0.43% up to 2.6% (Benacek, 1997d). The spread
varies if the GDP is measured at commercial or at the PPP US Dollars. The relative position of
the Czech GDP per capita among countries has fallen from the rank of 11th – 14th in 1949 to 28th
– 30th in 1996.
7
 For more information about the Czech privatization see Mejstrik et al., 1997, pp. 55-67.
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productive assets were excluded form privatization (public utilities, electric power
stations, railways, etc.) and in many industrial firms the Government retained its share.
Thus the insiders could get in Czechia an exceptionally wide space for their
privatization activities (both formal and informal). The ensuing intransparent corporate
governance was allowed by asymmetric information and signaling after 1994 that asset
stripping would not be an activity prosecuted by the law.
We can see from these figures that the voucher scheme, which was often blamed
for being the culprit of the Czech privatization failure, was not an exclusive
representative of the Czech non-standard privatization (Bornstein, 1997). Even a larger
amount, than the one devoted to voucher privatization, was privatized by other
intransparent methods characterized by a lack of financial capital, managerial expertise
and/or a will to transform the enterprises. Voucher privatization could have served as
one of the minor schemes of privatization, e.g. as was used in Poland under the Minister
of privatization Lewandowski. Voucher scheme could have become an intermediate
stage of asset privatization, postponing the process of finding final owners and still not
keeping the property in hands of bureaucrats. The governance impotence on the part of
individual voucher owners could be bypassed by concentrating the equity in mutual
funds or investment funds. That would have required, as a pre-requisite, the existence of
legal rules, judiciary, trained management of funds and a system of fund corporate
governance. The supervision of funds should have been very strict. It was most
probably not a random occurrence that in the Czech case none of these conditions was
present.
The whole opaque circumstances of the Czech privatization received a further
setback by the possibility to get an easy access to credit – a policy that at first looked
quite helpful and the support of which was taken as one of the top priorities of the
government. Table 1 shows that Czech banking policy differed from all transition
countries throughout 1994-99. In average the credit was 2.5-times more available
relative to output as it was in other transition countries. Similarly the monetary policy of
the National Bank was more expansionary than in other transition or even OECD
countries. The mounting opposition from the independent Czech National Bank to
monetary expansion demanded by the Government was growing after 1995. No surprise
that the political clash between the supporters of a more prudent policies and the Prime
Minister brought the country to a government crisis in 1997. The two waves of austerity
measures, that followed for a short period afterwards, unveiled that the Czech success in
growth and employment had very shaky foundations.
The favorable extremely high Czech saving rate (nearly 32% of GDP in average
during 1992-98) could indeed turn restructuring into a success. But this potential asset
recessed suddenly into an unexpected liability. A large part of savings were used for the
underpinning of privatization transfers by means of bank loans for unspecified
acquisitions, instead of using them strictly for productive purposes, such as
restructuring, R&D, new investments, new skills training, etc. The crowding-out effect
diverted both the private and the public savings into uses that had little common with
restructuring. Even though only a minor part of the privatization credits were granted
without a proper collateral or without any supervision of the bank over the corporate
governance, the enforcement of their recoupment was nearly impossible even in the
other cases, given the state of legislature and judiciary.
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Table 1: Credits to households and enterprises over GDP (in %) and the money stock
Credit availability, % of GDP M2/GDP, %Country
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1999
Czechia 52 55 56 60 62 56 67
Estonia 11 13 15 20 24 26 32
Hungary 25 22 21 21 23 23 44
Poland 11 11 13 16 17 21 40
Slovakia 26 24 28 36 42 39 62
Russia 7 8 7 8 11 10 19
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, 2000
Thus the state-owned or voucher-privatized Czech commercial banks became
the main actors in the privatization gamble. Their portfolio of loans was composed by
34% of classified credits in 1998, reaching 375 billion CZK in 1999 8. In addition,
Czech net inter-enterprise debts were estimated to amount 180 billion CZK in the same
year. If we add to that the debts to the National Property Fund, tax arrears, unpaid social
security and health insurance and outstanding wages, than we can find out that
approximately the equivalent of the full value of assets privatized under the non-
traditional schemes (estimated at approximately 600 billion CZK) was counter-
balanced by very problematic debts. That means, on one side there was an extensive
property given away by the state, while on the other side there appeared IOUs in hands
of the semi-state banks, closely linked with privatization, that could hardly be brought
to maturity. Neither the bulk of the mass privatized property, nor the loans for its
stabilization has shown a satisfactory economic performance. At least one of them was
wasted.
The privatization of property under soft-budget constraints (transferred either
freely or through a soft loan), that was dominant in the Czech Republic during 1992-95,
did not bring about conditions that would lead to well-defined corporate governance,
stable ownership, dominance of principals over agents and to entrepreneurship that
would have long-term productive aims. Restructuring, profit maximization and market
competitiveness were not objective functions of owners generated by the process of
privatization directed “from above”.
What was the philosophy behind privatization “from above”? To answer this
question one has to turn to the structure of values that rested behind such a paramount
strategic political decision. Taken from the theoretical point of view, the central concept
of production in any economic system is represented by production factors.
Traditionally these are represented by natural resources, physical capital, labor and
                                                
8
 The proportion of accumulated bad loans per total loans in 1999 was 31.4% in Czechia. It was
comparable only with Slovakia (40%) and Romania (36.6%), while in Hungary and Estonia it
was 3% and in Poland 15% (see IMF International Financial Statistics, 2000, The World Bank
Database on Financial Development and Structure, 2000 and The EBRD Transition Report,
2000). Various subsidies and bailouts paid by the government or by other State institutions (like
the Fund of National Property, Czech National Bank, etc.) are excluded from these estimations
of “implicit subsidies”.
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human capital. The decision as to how those limited factors should be allocated is
subject to the quality of ownership. The question is therefore two-pronged: “who are the
entrepreneurs” and “what do they own?” There was a Czech national consensus that by
intensive and rapid privatization everyone would get a chance to become an
entrepreneur. But what state property could have been released and transferred to these
entrepreneurs ?
Restitutions would be a natural solution but they did not receive wide public
support. This was particularly true of the potential restitutions to Sudeten Germans,
Jews and large industrialists expropriated in 1945. Very little would be then left to eager
outsiders. It would be a loss to politicians, as their role in the process would be
marginalized. Thus even the land restitutions of co-op farms did not become a priority.
The property of state-owned small businesses that could be sold in auctions was too
small. The resulting sales, undertaken during 1991-93 under the “small-scale
privatization act”, comprised of only US$ 1.3 billion as a result.
Czech politicians were finally tempted by opting for “instant capitalism” by
means of de-etatising as many state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and as quickly as
possible. Their assets were valued at US$ 50 billion. It was the Voucher Privatization
Act that satisfied both the demand of the population and the aspirations of politicians for
an economic power. By giving symbolic chances to 8 million potential capitalists (out
of the population of 15 million) it also offered a political triumph to politicians who
could orchestrate the grand distribution from their hierarchies. Although private
ownership would be dispersed, it was assumed that the redistribution of property to final
owners/users would take place automatically and smoothly. Since this did not actually
come true, let us turn to that crucial point more closely.
It was argued theoretically, by using both the theory of factor location and the
Coase theorem, that the initial misallocation of resources did not matter, once market
negotiations and trade could lead to their more efficient redistribution. The desired
outcome would require that transaction costs be very low both in acquiring the liquidity
and in trading of equity. It was somehow forgotten that there was a third condition: that
property rights be clearly defined and enforceable. The first condition (concerning
money liquidity) seemed to be solved by the continued extremely high level of national
savings. The Czech National Bank was also yielding to pressures for an expansionary
monetary policy and the commercial banks were inclined to provide easy credit 9. The
second condition, concerning unhampered equity trading, was also satisfied, once there
was political opposition in creating one stock exchange10. Indeed, until 1998 there were
virtually no enforceable rules for equity trading.
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 It was publicly admitted by former Prime Minister Klaus in 1998 that this was the reason why
his ODS party explicitly refused to privatize banks to foreign owners throughout 1990-97 and
kept them under political control.
10
 There were in fact created three stock exchanges – Bourse, RM-System (for retail security
trading) and SCP (the Center of Commercial Securities set especially for extra-market trading –
sic !). As there were nearly 3000 stock titles traded and there was no regulation on the business
practices, these stock exchanges did not generate prices that would be related to real market
values of the enterprises traded. As over 85% of stocks were traded through SCP, without
revealing their prices to the public, the arbitrage was either impossible or it was not stabilizing.
The information asymmetry became a rule. By using fictitious trading, the big traders could set
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The objective to trigger off a privatization scheme that would be orchestrated by
the government required the creation of various institutions and conditions that would
bring the privatization into compatibility with markets. The golden rule is clear here: the
institutions should be driven by the demand side and the requirements of competition. In
another words, they should not be responsive to the vested interests on the side of
supply, governance and politics. In the first place the privatization would require the
creation of regulatory commissions for auctions, tenders and public bidding, such as the
Ministry of Privatization, National Property Fund, departments for privatization at
ministries, Regional Privatization Boards and the network for voucher bidding. Though
the idea to simulate markets by introducing elements of competition in bidding was set
in good faith, the whole institutional  arrangement of the mass privatization could not
get rid of its bureaucratic nature. The resultant privatization hierarchies integrated very
soon with different hierarchies: political parties, central government, regional public
administration, state banks, state-owned enterprises and its networks of vested interests.
The moral hazards of Czech privatization backfired on the State, which became
burdened with mounting debts. As it became very difficult to vindicate the Government
from its responsibility for privatization, a larger share of the public budget had to be
released for various rescue operations and guarantees. Contrary to political
proclamations state paternalism could not be relinquished. That is why the share of
public revenues per GDP could not decline significantly below the magic barrier of 50%
11
. As was found by Coricelli et al., 1997, this problem challenged all transition
countries where government was bound to be an active player in the economy 12.
Though the original share of the Czech state budget revenues in GDP decreased from
67.2% in 1989 to 43% in 1999 (measured by the tax quota method), which is only
slightly above the average EU level, it is still far above the “natural” level pertaining to
its economic development. If the revenues of the state budget are consolidated with
revenues of extra-budgetary institutions 13, the share characterizing the burden of the
Czech state would rise over 50%.
                                                                                                                                              
any price that was then masquerading as an official “market” price. Any fraudulent insider
trading then became a legalized transaction, what set virtually no transaction cost burden to
speculative transactions or to asset stripping (in Czech it was called “tunneling”). On the other
hand, that very arrangement caused a serious transaction cost on transactions with productive
aims. The Czech equity market became a typical bear market. Its prices fell throughout 1993-98.
11
 According to the World Bank studies (see its World Development Report 1997: The State in a
Changing World), the empirically observed share of public revenues per GDP is an exponential
function of GDP per capita. Because Czech GDP per capita varies from 5 to 12 thousand USD
according to commercial or PPP exchange rate, the Czech “natural” level of the indicator of
public revenues per GDP should vary between 28% and 38% (see Benacek, 1997a).
12
 The exceptions were countries where the alternative hierarchical structures (i.e. “oligarchs” or
“mafia”) took over the role of the State, as it was in some transition countries of Central Asia.
Privatization was thus extended to such fields like the “privatization of privatization” or to the
“privatization of the State”.
13
 Here we mean such institutions as the State Health Insurance, Fund of National Property,
State Consolidation Bank, Czech Financial Institution and Czech National Bank. We could
extend the list to include unpaid taxes, waived taxes, inflation tax and seignorage - see Benacek,
1997a. They all represent certain potential (forgone) revenues and expenditures that increase the
power of the state administration over the economy.
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A strong and wealthy state means a strong government sector and an over-sized
sector of public administration. Therefore it should not be a surprising fact that the
number of employees in the Czech public administration increased after the introduction
of a “liberal” market economy from 95,743 in 1990 to 177,770 in 1999, i.e. by 86% 14.
At the same time one should not presuppose that this growth implies an increase in the
quality of government services. High public revenues allow the state to maintain larger
public employment, which leads to higher bureaucracy and to a rise in transaction costs
for running private businesses. Those who will be hit most adversely are SMEs and the
firms under intensive restructuring.
An easy access to credit combined with non-existent equilibrium market prices
of equity stocks and high information asymmetry on the capital market resulted in the
creation of perversely-functioning capital markets 15. There the economic agents’
objectives differed diametrically from the objectives of agents acting in stabilized
market economies. Firstly, the information asymmetry, loopholes in legislation and the
non-enforceability of property rights caused the looming of adverse selection. The new
equity owners recruited to a large extent from the ranks of people with a low sense of
business ethics. The success of particular  entrepreneurial activities depended therefore
significantly on the ability to use the informal information, insider trading and
bureaucratic networks – i.e. on the ability to make deals off the market. There the
corruption became a means of settlement. Thus the “skills” required for this kind of
entrepreneurship could differ widely from the skills needed for restructuring, strategic
planning, R&D and marketing. That is why the Communist “nomenclature” became so
successful in becoming large-scale capitalists (Benacek, 1994).
Secondly, the new capitalists did not (and could not) aim at long-run capital
gains. Instead of raising the discounted future yields of assets by restructuring and
improving the efficiency, a large part of owners and managers bet on asset stripping.
Why did the objective of moral hazard become so prevalent in the Czech economy? The
dominant way of privatization “from above” created neither functioning property rights
nor stable ownership. Notwithstanding that the Czech government succeeded in
minimizing the “wild privatization”, i.e. the asset stripping by employees or managers,
already during the pre-privatization phase, it did not preclude from its wide practicing in
the post-privatization phase. The position of new owners (principals) was often very
weak and enforcement of property rights was not backed by relevant institutional
arrangements.
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 See Statistical Yearbook of the Czech Republic, CSU, Prague, 2000, p. 289. The sharpest rise
of “new capitalist” bureaucracy happened at the regional or municipal offices, so that the central
authorities could have more “efficient” control over the society. It is a paradox that central
planning required a smaller network for doing the same job even without the help of the
markets.
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 Under such circumstances one should not be tempted to describe the resultant environment as
fully-fledged capital ”markets”. They either collapsed by failing to provide effective
information about the prices of assets traded (there was missing the link to their yields), or these
markets were not created at all and the allocation of capital resources had to rely on other
channels than on free and contestable markets. Bureaucratic negotiations, corruption, political
loyalty, nepotism and criminal favors were some of the non-market alternatives.
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The structure of new “capitalists” was transient by its very nature. They were
represented by a very wide spectrum of players:
• millions of voucher holders who had no decision-making powers,
• managers of investment funds, who, in principle, acted as agents of “principals”
coming from the previous group and who later converted into informal principals,
• managers of former SOEs who retained independence and decision-making powers,
• bank officials (from the top up to the clerks at low positions) who controlled the
accounts and the process of credit allocation,
• bureaucrats who were recruited from ministerial supervisory bodies, tax
administration, political parties and the regional administration,
• lawyers who had to cover-up transactions that under normal laws would be declared
illicit or criminal,
• “de iure” indigenous owners with concentrated equity stakes, who had to take loans
from banks and who depended on the “clearing” of their  privatization liabilities on
agreements with bureaucrats and lawyers,
• restitutors of firms originally nationalized after February 1948,
• small self-made entrepreneurs,
• foreign owners investing their own financial funds into the direct investment
ventures.
With the exception of the last three, all others were either quasi-owners or
owners with powers limited by various exogenous interferences.
Real owners are those who control both the assets’ principal and its yields, and
have the legal right to sell both of them freely on their own account. By privatizing “on
debt”, the real ownership of the property was limited by collaterals and by interest
payments. Since the collateral was often higher than current asset’s market value 16 and
the interest on loans was higher than current profits, it was very difficult to find another
party that would purchase the property and pay for it a higher price. Such an ideal
secondary owner would have to be able, after discounting for risks, to secure much
higher future yields than the primary owner was able to achieve.
Such a resale deal would be possible only if the firm was restructured and the
penetration on world markets was guaranteed. With the lack of experience in both
fields among the indigenous entrepreneurs and with the institutional environment not
designed for restructuring, the only party fitting to that treat could be found among the
foreign strategic investors. Once the foreign investors were reluctant to enter into such
deals during 1991-98, the only way out for the domestic owners was extending the
original redistributive objectives with the destructive ones 17. How was it possible?
                                                
16
 The asset price overshooting became a standard practice during the tenders for takeovers
when the bidders found out that the disbursement of their liabilities was not fully enforceable.
17
 The core of these problems is compatible with the hypothesis of Baumol, 1990, that
entrepreneurship and its aim for profit or power is omnipresent in all societies. The problem is into
which alternative economic fields - productive, redistributive or destructive - the entrepreneurship
17
It is true that the destructive approach to property, though typical for wars, is not a
feature characteristic for normal market economies. We have to proceed further into the
nature of specific forms of mass privatization in order to uncover its destructive effects.
5.  Privatization, Sunk Capital and Restructuring
The answer to the issue of destructive entrepreneurial motivation is closely
associated with the privatization “from above”, how it particularly evolved in the Czech
case. One of its intrinsic features was that it turned an excessively large part of
assets into sunk physical capital. Sunk capital is defined as the value invested into
those physical assets that cannot be recovered when the firm leaves the industry.
Sutton, 1991, has extended the definition even further. According to him, sunk costs are
those fixed outlays, which are associated with acquiring a single plant of minimum
efficient scale (set-up costs) and/or developing and establishing a product line (R&D or
revamping outlays).
There are three types of sunk costs associated with privatized SOEs. First, the
costs of past investments (from the centrally planned period) that cannot move
immediately and without cost to another industry. Second, the costs of purchasing these
assets by a privatizing party. Third, the costs expended on restructuring (e.g. on new
technology and R&D), especially if the returns on them are risky. These costs represent
so-called specific factors. According to Krugman and Obstfeld, 1997, p. 39-62, the
factor reallocation due to restructuring always hits the owners of that factor that is
specific. By privatizing on debt, proportional to the book value (as different from the
often lower market value) of the asset privatized, the risk of losses is shifted from the
government on privatizers.
But privatization has a full meaning only if it is associated with restructuring and
restructuring requires that physical assets could be either intensively reallocated or
intensively replaced. However, with given sunk costs, none of these moves are
possible, and the money expended for the acquisition of the property is at risk.
Privatization on debt, with its scope artificially enlarged by political arrangements,
exposed unexpectedly a large part of national physical capital to a risk of destruction
because the aims (or conditions) of privatization got into a conflict with restructuring.
By its very economic nature, the market price of a sunk capital is zero because it
has no alternative uses. This outcome went against the original aim of privatization – to
turn the accumulated old physical capital into hands where it would be used more
efficiently. Thus, by asset stripping, only a part of the assets could be transferred into
alternative uses. As an outcome, we could observe a behavior that can be branded as a
gradualist “graceful demise” (Benacek, 1997b or Benacek, Shemetilo, Petrov, 1998).
                                                                                                                                              
is allocated in the given period. The causes of such moves must be then traced into the conditions
and incentives for such decisions. First, we can cast doubts if the Czech large-scale privatization
was consistent with Schumpeter’s views on the role of entrepreneurs as destructive creators. The
original aims of Czech privatizers were underpinned by conditions that were compatible with
redistributive behavior only. However, it was too late when it became apparent in 1997 that the
formal entitlement to property through privatization was not leading to a stable development. The
asset stripping (tunneling) at a minor or larger scale became in many cases the only activity that
would be rational, given the endowments of skills and institutions.
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The burden of sunk capital can be ameliorated only if its value can be gradually
recouped, for example by depreciation. That means, in the optimal case the sunk
capital’s full physical capacity should be retained (i.e. it should not be scrapped) and the
restructuring should proceed mainly on the side of organization, employment, incentives
and marketing 18.
However, if a part of the capital is immediately recyclable, for example by
selling it to another enterprise (e.g. a SME) or to final consumers, it is sooner or later
either sold by the principals or embezzled by a myriad of agents around them. Under
weak property rights, this will happen notwithstanding the fact that the remaining
property could lose all its productive functions. It is a suboptimal outcome typical for
situations ruled by prisoner’s dilemma, even if there are more productive alternatives
subject to long-run co-operation, such as the recoupment of assets through depreciation.
If the property rights enforcement plunges into anarchy (e.g. the ownership is
indeterminate and/or the property rights are not socially sanctioned) the kleptocracy
becomes a standard. As was pointed out by Olson, 1982 and Olson, 1998, the rent-
seeking behavior can have various degrees of intensity. The most detrimental of them is
set when the property rights can be claimed by anyone, what Olson described as the
case of “roving bandits”. There is no encompassing interest in the property from any of
the competing claimants – either principals or agents or employees.
As was mentioned previously, the Czech large-scale privatization of SOEs
generated an excessive number of competing property claimants. The procedures for
becoming a claimant were easy and also the procedures of asset stripping were not
challenged by punishment. That resulted in non-productive objectives of owners, capital
losses and rigidities on the supply side. As the majority of assets of an enterprise are
complementary and if only their transferable parts are stripped away (at what-so-ever
positive price) the remaining sunk capital becomes derelict, burdened with debts and
turned aside of production. Since it also loses all its functions as a collateral, the burden
is shifted on creditors – on banks, suppliers, passive equity holders, social insurance
funds and workers. From them the burden is shifted on the Government, the State and
the whole society.
The soft market environment and the importance of vertical networks in the
socio-political hierarchies, that the Czech mass privatization brought with itself, did not
offer much scope for the entrepreneurship in the Schumpeterian sense. It did not lead to
links between ownership and decision making, risk bearing, innovation, re-investment
of profits and the reallocation of factors in accordance to perfect market signals. On the
contrary, the mass privatization brought about the Schumpeterian degeneration in
entrepreneurship where firms are too large, their agents dominate the owners and where
the short-term vested interests lead to rent-seeking, decline and the dominance of the
state bureaucracy over the private sector.
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 This approach is different from the shock therapy, as was practiced e.g. in Eastern Germany.
This kind of a gradual approach to transformation was successfully practiced in Vietnam (see
Van Tho, 2000) and partially also in China (Wu, 2000). According to Murrell, 1991, p. 43, the
state sector should be reduced only slowly, at a pace consistent with an “optimal capital
replacement policy”.
19
There are many studies which try to assess how the alternative privatization
schemes could influence the performance of enterprises and the behavior of their
owners. For example, Djankov, 1999, offers a highly simplistic picture based on data
from Moldova and Georgia that managerial buy-outs are a more efficient way of
privatization than the mass-privatization through vouchers. While the latter is perceived
as a windfall profit where the moral hazard becomes the ruling post-privatization
strategy, the former insider-dominated ownership is more prone to restructuring and
productive orientation. This is hard to believe if the experience of some other countries
is considered.
A more persuasive view is provided by Alexeev, 1999, who treats even the
managerial buy-outs as a rent-seeking contest where the incumbents (e.g. the managers
and their associates) become the highly problematic winners. The superiority of chances
for the dominance of former “nomenclature” in mass privatization schemes is given by
their access to informal property rights over assets prior to the reform, information
asymmetry and the network capital invested in the hierarchy of state bureaucracy. The
higher is the deviation from the competitive standard of privatization, what Alexeev
calls a “genuine reform”, the more likely it is that privatization will degrade into a rent-
seeking event pervaded by moral hazard. The legacy of privatization dominated by rent-
seeking is generally counter-productive even in the long run due to spin-offs into
political lobbying, corruption, ethics, institutional distortions, income inequality,
redistributive taxation and a lack of motives for restructuring.
The main weakness of the privatization “from above” therefore does not rest in
potential frauds, insider trading and appropriation but mainly in the inefficient usage of
the property so acquired. Not only that owners skilled in winning bureaucratically
contrived privatization deals are seldom efficient in restructuring its productive assets,
but the whole institutional environment, designed for such deals, hampers the process of
finding the final owners motivated by productive aims and restructuring. Let us pose
another question: would it be advisable, having learned that “the king of mass
privatization is naked”, to introduce a hard budget constraint for all firms? That would
imply that both the Government and the banks would have to persist on an absolute
financial discipline and punish the trespassers by bankruptcy procedures.
This problem is widely discussed by Frydman et al., 2000, and Maskin, Xu,
2001. We can agree that this would be the optimal policy for those enterprises whose
objective function is restructuring and efficient governance. However, if the domestic
economy is split into two or even three sectors guided by different behavioral conditions
(foreign enterprises, indigenous firms under authentic private ownership and the sector
of mass-privatized or state-owned firms), this general strategy would be suboptimal. It
would only speed-up the process of non-creative destruction that commenced by formal
privatization, virtual restructuring and deficiencies in corporate governance. The
objective of transformation rests in the exact opposite: in rescuing of the property
subject to sunk cost and their transfer to more productive alternative uses. There, by
means of a depreciation, recoup at least a part of it into a cash-flow that will be
reinvested. The imposition of a soft-budget criteria from the side of creditors, such as
taxation and depreciation incentives, credits and subsidies to those firms in which
remained a chance of their productive restructuring, is not necessarily irrational. It
prevents the demise of firms that are capable of at least partial restructuring through
medium-term bankruptcy procedures or ownership changes.
20
The impotence of Czech indigenous firms that were privatized by non-standard
methods 19 can be revealed by comparing them with firms under foreign ownership. In
1997 70% of the profits in the manufacturing sector were earned by international firms
which had 17% share of employment and 28% share of output. If we take all 994 Czech
manufacturing enterprises with employment over 249 workers (as in 1998) and exclude
both the domestic monopolies and the international firms, we can find only a couple of
dozen among them that would be profitable in a long-run or otherwise credible from an
economic point of view.
Privatization can thus lead to very unexpected results. Some firms can improve
their performance while some others may sink into worse problems. As was confirmed
in the study of the Russian privatization (Perevalov, Grimadi and Dobrodey, 2000), the
quality of privatization and its methods are crucial. There is nothing like the
“privatization on average”. Some mass privatization techniques (the exemplary is the
voucher privatization) are not superior to keeping the enterprises under state
governance. The privatization technique can have specific impacts on performance. The
impacts on profitability, labor productivity and innovation need not be positively
correlated and can depend on the techniques chosen.
As was explained above, privatization orchestrated by the government
bureaucracy is marked by information asymmetry, moral hazard, adverse selection and
dead-weight losses inside the privatized firms. The losses easily spill over into the
banking sector and bring a burden on the public finance. In a vicious circle the taxes
cannot be lowered and thus the efficient firms “finance” the bad firms. With the
majority of privatized firms immersed in debts and its profits sinking to red figures
because of slow restructuring and asset stripping, the lobbyism for bailouts threatens to
destabilize the government. However, the government can defend its position by
postponing the bankruptcies by weak judiciary for bankruptcy procedures. As an
outcome, the gap between the legal infrastructure and the need for economic reforms
widens.
The reasons why the government should put up with loopholes multiply after
each round of bailouts. The laws regulating the banking supervision, mortgages,
collaterals and capital markets get stalled. The judiciary “suddenly” loses control over
frauds and the disbursement of debts is enforced only symbolically. The burden of the
transition finally spins away from weak firms onto competitive firms that brought its
restructuring into a successful stage. These firms have higher taxes and higher public
bureaucracy. They run a higher risk of payment defaults from their customers and the
resources absorbed by stagnating firms are not released for their more efficient usage
elsewhere. Low GDP growth implies that wages remain low and thus the aggregate
demand is low. The social disappointment leads to political instability. The expectations
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 The non-traditionality of the “Czech way” concerns both the contents and the form. In the
former, the financial sector was left to a large extent both unprivatized and without proper
supervision and the public administration was left in the hands of bureaucracy. As to the forms,
the voucher method, the direct sales and the public tenders were superintended by bureaucratic
networks. Thus these methods represented a risky approach liable to moral hazard and an
allocation of property to intermediary insiders. The risks increased enormously once the
institutional framework went off handle of the government and its procedures became “touted”
by speculative privatizers themselves.
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for growth are low and thus the dynamics of such an economy will remain low. One
simple decision about the strategy of privatization may turn from a temporary problem
to chronic malaise.
6.  Privatization from Below
The question of whether there was a fundamentally alternative approach to
Czech privatization scheme is usually dismissed as irrelevant. Why should one ask such
questions once the privatization has been already finished? And what is a fundamental
alternative to privatization: is it non-privatization? What is omitted is that
“privatization” is not primarily a political question. Primarily and intrinsically it is an
economic question, dealing with ownership, corporate governance and their efficiency.
As such, privatization is an open problem that has no pre-conceived answers.
Let us look again at the Czech philosophy of privatization. Generally speaking,
Czech privatization was conceived as a reversal of Communist nationalization. There
was also a political consensus that only a minor part of the physical assets will be
returned to original owners or their heirs. The value of the property privatized was equal
to approximately two GDPs. Because the chances to get a share were open to nearly
everyone, the agenda of the property return became a dominant economic topic in the
Czech society throughout 1991-95. The issue how to become rich by the redistribution
of property overshadowed many other economic topics that were crucial for the shaping
of events in the long run. It was not considered, for example, that the property was often
antiquated, incorrectly allocated, poorly administered and often it was an indispensable
sunk capital. Its mere ownership could not guarantee automatically any positive returns.
The responsibility for losses should be also a part of privatization deals.
What was even more important for the successful ownership was the expansion
of  physical capital by new investments. As on one hand capital ownership transfers
were raised to a symbol of an omnipotent fetish, less attention was given to new
investments on the other hand. Thus, as the whole institutional framework was
becoming adjusted to facilitate the redistributive requirements, the institutional support
to new investments was switched to a periphery. Human capital was another factor that
remained separated from the issues of privatization. The decision that the development
of education and science should be postponed and that they (as allegedly factors
temporarily irrelevant to the main issues) should bear the costs of transformation, was
also unfortunate but logical. It followed from an unduly simplified and politically biased
views on privatization.
If the privatization is conceived as a transfer of all production factors from
the paternalistic State to the control and decision-making of the non-State
(preferably private) bodies, then attention should be devoted not only to the
transfers of existing national physical capital to private hands, but also to the
creation of savings and their allocation into a stock of new privately-owned capital.
The same treatment, as with new capital formation, belongs to the formation of
human capital and its allocation for the support of private business ventures.
Similarly in the labor market, privatization should be related to the means how
workers might establish their own businesses, for example as self-employed
entrepreneurs. If privatization is as complex as that, the whole process of
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privatization can be left neither to bureaucrats nor it can be limited to mere legal
property transfers.
Privatization “from below” can be described as the “wide approach” while
privatization “from above” is the “narrow approach”. Thus the former contains the latter
as a subset and it extends over to the reallocation of other factors than the existing
capital. The basic fact, that the reallocation of existing property is not the only issue to
be solved by privatization, implies that also the very substance of privatization should
be a wider concept than a mere reshuffling of ownership. It departs from the all-
embracing redistributive aims towards the dominance of productive aims. It is no
longer crucial and sufficient that there are new owners of an old physical property but
that the national property (production factors), that were formerly under the tutelage of
the State, gets under the control of clearly defined owners that can become actors with
full-fledged responsibilities in the system of property rights.
At this point our attention can be switched to the generic private sector where
the firms are authentically “private”, that means they were established as private from
the very outset – de novo or start-ups. In the narrow sense, such firms could not start-up
as merely privatized SOEs. In a wider context de novo firms could have commenced
with a privatized state property but, from the very outset, their owners should be clearly
defined and their control over the property as principals should be unchallenged, so that
they are able to transform the fundamentals of the firm by restructuring. The
restructuring should be deep enough do deal with new investments, labor relocations
and absorption of new human capital. What is crucial in that respect are the intra-firm
relationships dealing with the quality of management and governance (as a function of
human capital and institutional arrangements), industrial relationships (as a function of
incentives and morals) and the ability to reallocate the cash flows into new investments.
It is evident that the generic private sector in a post-Communist society, where
there were hardly any private firms existing during the central planning and with very
low accumulated personal savings, had to be very frail at the beginning. There are three
main channels for their rise:
• The green-field investments of foreign direct investors.
• The takeovers and acquisitions of foreign direct investors who subject the firms to a
deep restructuring.
• The registration of brand-new indigenous firms that were built as “de novo” from an
own or borrowed capital. Such firms will be generally small or medium sized.
Once the privatization “from below” is orchestrated from the grass roots of the
economy and once the aims of privatization are dominated by productive objectives,
such an arrangement will dramatically alter the attitudes of the private sector to the
institutional build-up and to politics:
• In the first place its actors need effectively functioning markets, especially the
capital markets and banks.
• In order to have the position of principals inexorably fixed as undisputed owners of
capital assets, residual claimants and actors liable for the strategic decisions, there
arises a demand for clearly defined and enforceable property rights guaranteed by
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the State. It would induce a pressure for creating a transparent legislation and
functioning judiciary.
• The relationship of generic private owners to the State, the government and politics
is different from the relationships of redistributionally motivated privatization
actors. The former would expect that public institutions should not be so much
preoccupied with redistributions and bailouts of failing enterprises but they should
devote its powers to an efficient provision of public goods.
• Since the public administration plays a less active role in the privatization from
below and the detrimental effects of bureaucracy on firms are asymmetric 20, the
stronger position of SMEs and dynamic firms in the environment of privatization
from below would press the Government more successfully for lower taxes and
lower burden of bureaucracy.
Our conclusions are of crucial importance for economic policy-making. We
affirm that the development of the societies in transition may depend for very long
time on the way that privatization was initiated and later conducted. Privatization
in an economy in which  the State was an exclusive owner of nearly all productive
assets may unleash in people such long-lasting motives and expectations that could
divert the behavior of the whole society to aberrant patterns. Let us repeat again the idea
of Baumol, 1990, that it depends just on incentives whether economic agents
(entrepreneurs) act productively or attempt at realizing redistributive or socially
destructive aims. An improperly considered strategic decision at the outset in one single,
but paramount agenda such as privatization, can induce spin-offs of unfavorable moves
into many other fields. Society may then find itself locked in a series of induced
maladjustments. Though society may later find the situation untenable, the enduring
hysteresis effect will make the new adjustments difficult.
First, there is a problem of co-ordination while the interests of participating
parties are often in conflict. Privatization is not a repeated game and its actors get easily
involved in a prisoner’s dilemma. Second, the winners from initial rounds of property
acquisitions invest (e.g. in cash or in kind) into their ownership. They also adjust the
returns to their property to existing economic parameters. Very often these are the
legislative loopholes that the system brought with itself. Any attempt to eliminate these
loopholes is then opposed by powerful lobbies. At least, such is the observation that we
could draw from the Czech history of privatization.
In Table 2 we have tried to make a summery of our findings and trace different
potential outcomes arising from alternative approaches to privatization. The typology of
“A” and “B” was inspired by the model framework proposed by Winiecki, 2000, and
Kornai, 2000. Also Alexeev, 1999, p. 463, contrasts the mass insider privatization with
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 It was empirically observed in the USA and the EU that bureaucracy hit more harshly the
SME sector and dynamic firms (i.e. the smaller firms that were profitable or that were going
through restructuring). The burden of bureaucracy is usually represented by a fixed transaction
cost that is not proportional to firm size. For example, it was found in Netherlands that the costs
of administration of regulated activities in 1993 was 3500 ECU per employee for firms with less
than 10 employees, meanwhile the same burden for firms over 100 employees was only 600 ECU
per year (Molitor, 1995). The lobby of large firms in streamlining the regulation and in personal
networking is stronger for large firms than for small firms (see Stein et al., 1995).
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the rise of “genuinely entrepreneurial activities” which originate outside of the
privatization arrangements and under a very different motivational context.
Table 2: Different potential outcomes arising from alternative approaches to
privatization
No. Model “B”: Privatization from above Model “A”: Privatization from below
1 Power politics, human engineering “Organic” development from grass roots
2 Rising role of state and bureaucracy Rising role of autonomously acting economic
agents protected by legal framework
3 Redistribution of existing capital assets Creation of new capital assets
4 Domination of old firms (SOEs) Domination of new firms (de novo)
5 Communist nomenklatura retaining its
economic positions
Emergence of new entrepreneurial and
managerial class
6 Acquisition of property on debt Acquisition of property from own savings
7 State and banks as final creditors Entrepreneurs as final creditors
8 Debtors dominating creditors Creditors dominating debtors
9 Easy access to money Tight access to money
10 Easy fiscal policy Tight fiscal policy
11 Soft budget constraint Hard budget constraint
12 Privatization of banks postponed Privatization of banks at the start
13 Creation of phony capital markets Creation of efficient capital markets
14 Low supply response as a constraint to
growth
Low aggregate demand as a constraint to
growth
15 Intransparent myriad of owners and
residual claimants
Clearly defined owners
16 Insiders and information asymmetry
dominate the creation of rules
Competition and the interests on the demand
side dominate the creation of rules
17 Agents dominating principals Principals dominating agents
18 Adverse selection of owners and managers
and their forced criminalization
Fraud and tax evasion is not a rewarding
strategy
19 Buildup of the rule of law is postponed Priority in the buildup of the rule of law
20 Asset stripping as an objective function of
entrepreneurship
Efficiency and capital yields as an objective
function
21 Profits dependent on relationships to state
and bank hierarchies
Profits dependent on competitiveness on
contestable markets
22 Failing firms subsidized by successful ones Profits are retained in firms and reinvested
23 Adverse selection: inefficient firms survive Selection by contestability: efficient firms
survive and unprofitable firms fail
24 Rising role of public budgets and taxation Taxes can be potentially decreased
25 Low growth or growth easily undermined
by macroeconomic demand shocks
Steady growth based on sound supply side
26 Growing gap between firms with FDI and
inflexible indigenous firms
Indigenous firms benefit from innovation
spillovers, imitation and network linkages
27 Political crises and social apathy Political consensus and civil society
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The theoretical background to our classification of characteristics can be traced
to Schumpeter and his description of entrepreneur as the crucial actor of capitalism.
Privatization is a policy aiming at promoting both capitalism (i.e. private property) and
entrepreneurship. However, privatization alternatives can also lead to alternative ways
how this objective is implemented. For example, alternative models of building-up the
private ownership lead to alternative institutional, behavioral and organizational
outcomes. In model “B” the implementation of privatization policies diverges from
Schumpeterian productive processes based on property rights, personalized governance,
risk-bearing, competition, allocational adjustments and innovation, as they are assumed
in model “A”. The Schumpeterian model is also gradual where adjustments to factor
and commodity allocations are constantly checked by inexorable impersonalized
markets. The tenor of such capitalism is in efficiency and governance. On the other
hand, model “B” reflects the exogenous “privatization shock” in which the selection of
both the owners and the property are to a large extent random. The objective functions
of owners and the market structure borne in such conditions are more akin to
Schumpeterian degenerated entrepreneurship where the firms become too large, the
principals are dominated by agents and the risk is finally transferred on other parties,
such as banks or governments.
The real economy is, of course, more varied in outcomes, as its privatization
techniques and government policies are heterogeneous. The Czech economy during
1991-1997 was to a large extent correlated with characteristics of the model “B”. The
financial crisis of 1997 and the economic crisis of 1998-99 reversed the conditions
enlisted in lines 7 through 12 in model “B”. Though our aim was to come with generally
valid implications, many of the outcomes in Table 2 were inspired by the Czech reality
of mass privatization and its effects on the behavioral patterns of its agents. We should
keep in mind that the Czech mass privatization (if we set aside the unique German
case), aimed to be the fastest and the most intensive among the post-Communist
countries. Because of the high speed, the spontaneous “wild privatization” prelude was
rather weak until 1994, when the official part of privatization was approaching to its
end. At that time Prime Minister Klaus proclaimed the transition finished and declared
the Czech economy “a normally functioning market economy”. His wishful thinking,
confusing nominal privatization with real transformation, was soon to be challenged.
The end of 1994 was marked by a rise of the so-called “third wave of privatization”. A
re-privatization was a natural backlash due to the uncompleted work provided by the
privatization commanded “from above”. The majority of asset stripping occurred in that
period.
Theoretically speaking, the process of finding final owners was expected to
happen by nearly everyone. It was justified due to the expected effect of the Coase
theorem, as we have discussed it previously. It was assumed that the transient owners
would sell their entitlements to those who would feel better prepared for the allocation
and usage of assets. It was thought the three stock exchanges would mediate that job.
Instead of it, a new belated wave of asset stripping could loom with an unattenuating
force. At the same time the Government did not assume any responsibility to supervise
or regulate the swollen re-distributional drive and left the process to its “unhampered
completion”.
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In 1997 it was apparent that from approximately 840 former SOEs in the
industrial sector that were privatized by mass methods and that remained without a
strategic foreign investor, only a handful were viable. The vast majority of large
enterprises had problems with losses, debts, efficiency, foreign competition and
contracting demand. On the other hand, the SME sector looked less shaken, though still
fighting for a space occupied by ailing large firms. Between 1991-98, the share of
enterprises with more than 500 employees on the total number of firms with
employment over 25 persons shrank from 31% to 16%. The employment in small
businesses with up to 25 workers, where over 70% of firms were established as de novo,
increased from 17% to 38% 21. The question for our further study is whether this trend
can be expected to continue, based on higher viability of new firms over old firms, or
whether it was just temporary.
7.  The Empirical Evidence about Czech Authentic Private
Enterprises
Once we have arrived at a conclusion that the establishment of the authentic
(generic) private sector is of a strategic significance, it is our next task to see whether
there is in the Czech economy an empirical evidence showing that this sector is more
viable than the sector of privatized former state owned enterprises. If the evidence were
in conflict with our hypothesis, then would it cast doubts on the validity of statement
that the privatization “from below” might be a superior one? Our method of hypothesis
testing will be based on a comparison of the performance of SMEs with the remaining
firms. As is known since the seminal study of Olson, 1965, the linkages between the
government and the industrial sector are subject to information asymmetry and that
government policies favor smaller and concentrated pressure groups over extensive
ones. As an outcome, we should be prepared for the existence of a bias and adverse
selection. The problem could be that the dominance of an inferior privatization may
cause the crowding-out of the space for the superior one.
The tendency to treat large indigenous firms differently than SMEs is revealed
by the extent of the Czech government support in the forms of explicit subsidies and
bailouts. While former SOEs received approximately US$ 14 billion between 1990-99
as support from State funds, the support of the SMEs, whose share on GDP was
comparable with the share of former SOEs, was less than US$ 1 billion. The statistically
reported profitability of large firms was then overestimated and the viability of those
firms was biased.
7.1.  Problems with Data
Our original idea was to base our study on industrial statistics collected by the Czech
Statistical Office. Each firm over 100 employees must provide a quarterly and an annual report
with approximately 25 indicators of production, costs and sales. Firms over 25 employees have
to provide annual data and the remaining smaller firms are accessed by random surveys.
Unfortunately after we have acquired and pre-processed the raw data for 1994 and 1998
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 These estimations are based on Monte Carlo simulations with data from 1998 micro census.
The source of our data can be found in Jurajda and Terrell, 2001, as will be described later.
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(comprising over 12000 enterprises), we have discovered that for many of the small and
medium firms there were partially missing statistics. For analyzing the firms with less than 25
employees (representing approximately 15% of industrial output) we ought to reduce the data
population to a meaningless sample. Also the firms with 25-100 employees had problems with
compatibility of contents with the sector of firms with more than 100 employees, though at a
minor scale. If we proceeded with the work on industrial data the results for small and medium-
sized firms could have been unbearably biased. So finally we have resigned from relying on this
source of data.
We asked then the Ministry of Industry and Trade for providing us their already
checked and corrected statistics. Unfortunately there we could work only with data already
aggregated into 14 manufacturing industries in NACE classification and the years available
were 1995 and 1998. The firms were classified into three groups. Large firms with 500 and
more employees, medium firms with 100-499 employees and “small” firms with less than 100
employees, including the self-employed workers. Since we could work only with firms grouped
by size (i.e. we were not able to distinguish between new and old firms), we are obliged to
interpret our results under the following assumption: small firms were correlated with new firms
so highly that we could interpret their characteristics as those of de novo firms. Medium-size
firms included a large segment of former SOEs, some of more independent plants of which split
from the large corporations and got privatized separately. Their results in some industries must
be interpreted with a caution.
Another problem is that we were not able to distinguish between indigenous and foreign
firms. Unfortunately foreign firms were not distributed in all three size categories in a uniform
manner (see Benacek, Zemplinerova, 1997). While the proportion of firms with FDI was similar
in the medium and the large enterprise groups, the group with smaller firms received a lesser
share. Since foreign firms were more productive and profitable than indigenous firms (in 1995
their productivity of labor was on average higher by 40% in 1995 and by 65% in 1998), some
industries with intensive inflows of FDI could show less persuasive performance in the sector of
small firms than in the sector of medium and large firms.
In order to assess also the non-industrial sector we also worked with data aggregated for
agriculture, industrial sector, construction, trade, catering and hotels, transport and
communication, financial sector and other services. There we could work only with three size
groups of enterprises: firms with over 249 employees, firms with 1-249 employees and self-
employed. Unfortunately here we have lost the groups of firms with 25-99 and 100-249
employees.
7.2.  Empirical Evidence about the Size, Structure and Performance of de
Novo Firms
Our first step should be to find out how the development of de novo firms
proceeded since the collapse of Communism in Czechoslovakia. The interest in the
development of Czech generic private sector and the SMEs was very marginal until
1998, if taken from the point of view of the central authorities. Their obsession with the
mass privatization of SOEs (and later with the resuscitation of these enterprises)
overshadowed the interest in the de novo sector. This neglect is also reflected by the
bias of statistics shying away from data on SMEs, with data on de novo firms practically
non-existent.
In the Czech statistical records we have found only one microcensus where the
businesses (enterprises) were classified into two categories: old and new (de novo). The
businesses included a large number of small firms which were practically the only de
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novo firms under Czech indigenous ownership. The census covered the years 1990-
1996. The panel micro-data was based on the working history of 2,284 workers, who
worked since 1980s until December 1996. Fortunately, the panel also described the
firms where the workers were employed. But unfortunately no later extension of the
project was undertaken.
Jurajda and Terrell, 2000, were the first economists to come up with an idea that
the census could be used for estimating the structure of firms that were classified into
public (such as health service, education and state administration), SOEs, privatized
SOEs and de novo firms. By using the Monte Carlo method, we can estimate the
proportion of employment that belonged to each of these ownership categories. This is
most probably the only resource that can address the problem how the new enterprises
developed throughout the Czech transition. The estimated results are indicated in Figure
2.
The graph in Figure 2, depicting de novo firms, shows that the process of
privatization commenced in 1991 with the employment of approximately 8% in the
newly founded firms. Their size was very small, practically equal to self-employment.
The state sector was clearly dominant, comprising the rest of the economy because
privatization still was in the offing. The rise of de novo firms during 1991-93 was
absolutely staggering. We can raise a hypothesis that the speed and the spontaneity of
this growth (at the end of 1993 over 30% of employees were in the newly borne firms)
was one of the most valuable capital assets that Czech society had for its quest for
prosperity. Though the build-up of new businesses slowed down after 1993, we can
presume that in the middle of 1996 the employment in de novo firms caught up with the
employment in former SOEs (at that time largely privatized by the so-called “mass
methods”) comprising nearly 40% of the total labor force. Since 1996 the growth of
new indigenous businesses stagnated. The initiative, however, was passed to large
enterprises established as “green-field ventures” by means of foreign direct investment.
Their success was observed first for data for 1994, as was presented by Benacek and
Zemplinerova, 1997.
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Figure 2: The trade-off of employment between old and new enterprises in 1991-
98 (shares are expressed in percentages)
Source: Jurajda and Terrell, 2001
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In 2001 there was another survey targeted on SMEs with the number of
employees ranging from 10 to 250. There the distinction was made for the de novo
firms, as different from privatized acquisitions and state-owned firms (see Mejstrik and
Zemplinerova, 2001). We can deduce from the sample of 195 enterprises taken from 5
industries that in 2000 approximately 55-70% of all SMEs were established as green-
field firms and only approximately 25-40% were acquisitions via privatization or
converted old firms. As the Table 3 indicates, there were large differences between
industries. Of course, this proportion is valid for firms with less than 250 employees
only. It is certain that the extension of the sample on larger firms will decrease the
average proportion of new firms on all firms. Would that decrease be as much as by 21
percentage points (i.e. to 47%), only then these figures would be compatible with the
estimation by Jurajda and Terrell, 2001. That would also imply that the proportion of
new firms on all firms with employment over 250 workers would have to be
approximately as little as 25%. That would also point on the rigidity in the sector of
large firms.
Table 3: Distribution of New and Old Enterprises in a Recent Survey on SMEs (data for 2000)
The number in brackets represents the number of firms responding, the next number is the
percentage of the sample in the given industry
 Type of firms
and industry: Food Clothing Wood Plastics
Information
technologies Total
New firms (21)  54% (33)  73% (16)  67% (15)  65% (47)  73%   (132)  68%
Old firms (16)  41% (11)  24% (7)  29% (7)  30% (16)  25%    ( 57)  29%
Total of all firms    (39)  20% (45)  23% (24)  12% (23)  12% (64)  33% (195)  100%
Source: Mejstrik and Zemplinerova, 2001
The above estimations and extrapolated data from the previous studies of the
author (Benacek, 1995 and 1997c) and findings of Zemplinerova, 2001, concerning
productivities can be used for a hypothesis estimating the share of the generic private
sector on GDP. Let us point out that we will not estimate so much the share of de novo
firms alone on GDP but rather the share of firms that reveal characteristics of a
stabilized ownership and management aiming at strategic productive development. That
means we will include here the de novo indigenous private enterprises (e.g. green-field
domestic investments), as well as foreign direct acquisitions that brought with
themselves new technologies and management, and that successfully restructured the
acquired firms. Table 4 contains the conclusions of our estimation.
The problem with the Czech authentic private sector is that a large part of it is
concentrated in very small (micro) firms that are very heterogeneous and the statistics
about which are scarce. As was observed in the case of Hungary (see Laki, 2001) many
of the very small firms are fictitious that either they are not active or they are active in
their non-productive orientation. For example, many of these firms were founded for tax
evasion or for other speculative purposes. Nevertheless, we have included them among
the authentic private firms because they were founded as de novo start-ups. As to the
medium-sized sector, we have estimated that more than a third of firms with 10-250
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employees cannot qualify as generic private firms because they were just separated and
privatized segments of former SOEs. A large part of the successful firms in that
medium-sized category are in fact foreign-owned enterprises. The remaining indigenous
firms in Table 4 are represented to a large extent by enterprises privatized by managers,
investment funds or other insiders. These firms are often heavily indebted and without
signs of a successful restructuring. On the other hand, the large firms under foreign
ownership, with approximately 30% share on GDP, still did not dominate the Czech
economy. Though the estimated 62.6% share of the generic private sector on GDP 22 is
relatively high, nearly 37% of GDP still remains stricken by the omen of unsolved
property rights, failed restructuring and instability. It is in this quite large “marginal”
sector where the firms can survive only subject to low wages and an undervalued
exchange rate, that both spill over to the rest of the economy. That prevents the
expansion of more successful firms and the growth based on more capital intensive
productive techniques 23. Further progress in the growth rates can thus be achieved if
this sector releases its resources that will be used more efficiently in the more successful
segments of the economy.
Table 4: Share of the authentic (de novo) private sector in given category of enterprises
and on GDP in 2000 – stylized facts
Enterprise category by
size
Share of authentic
firms on total
number of firms
in given category
Share of all firms
on total output
(value added)
Estimated
share of authentic firms
on total output
(value added)
0-9 employees 0.95 0.11 0.105
10-250 employees 0.63 0.34 0.214
over 250 (foreign) 0.90 0.30 0.267
over 250 (indigenous) 0.15 0.25 0.038
All firms - 1.00 0.626
Source: Own simulation of a hypothesis based on estimates from studies by
Zemplinerova, 2001, and the data of the author
Though the problems with expansion of the de novo firms were visible since the
separation of Czechoslovakia in 1993, one cannot deny that the position the SMEs
gained in the second half of 90s was not admirable. In many aspects the position of
Czech SMEs in 1998 was comparable with that one in developed industrial economies.
According to CESTAT statistics (Czech Statistical Office, 2000) the share of registered
entrepreneurs by total inhabitants in 1998 was 13,9% in the Czech Republic, while in
Poland and Hungary the level was slightly more than a half of that. Even if the Czech
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 This conclusion is close to the estimation of Selowsky, Mitra et al., 2001, who show in their
Figure 3.5 and Table 1 that Czech small enterprises (with 50 employees or less) have a 53%
share on total value added in 1998. Though this seems to us a too optimistic figure, the real
developments in 2000 in the whole authentic private sector can be compatible with our
estimation of a share of 62,6%.
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 See the comments on Figure 5 in the later text that will explain how the growth can be
stimulated by higher wages and by a switchover to more capita- intensive production.
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statistics could be methodologically biased, the degree of private initiative in the Czech
Republic to take risks and run businesses was generally assessed as the most intensive
among these three countries. Similarly Rona-Tas, 2001, has estimated that Czech
entrepreneurial activities are among the strongest among the post-Communist countries.
In Czechia one individual enterprise is registered per 4,3 economically active persons,
while in Hungary it was 5.7 and 8 in Slovakia.
Unfortunately, the comparative advantage of Czechia in this extremely
important economic field was not supported by the government. On the contrary, the
government policies drove a wedge between the rapidly emerging small and the
pampered large businesses.
As was already mentioned, we have found that there was only one statistical
microcensus dedicated to de novo enterprises. And there has been so far only one
published study based on its data: namely the survey by Munich, Svejnar and Terrell,
1999. There the behavior of firms was analyzed with an aim to explain the functioning
of the Czech labor market. For example, as the earnings structures in centrally planned
economies were very compressed, the question was how the privatization of state
owned enterprises (SOEs) and the emergence of de novo private firms changed the
returns to human capital and how the free wage setting modified the previous wage grid
in the public sector vis-à-vis the newly privatized firms.
The transition from the centrally planned to a market system resulted in a major
gradual increase in the rates of return to education, with the rates of return reaching
West European levels by 1996. This increase is found in all ownership categories of
firms. For example, the return from a year of education was 5,6% in the public sector,
6,5% in privatized SOEs and 6,1% in the de novo private firms. As to the returns of a
year of experience the difference was much more substantial. It was 1,5% in the public
sector, 2,2% in privatized SOEs and 3% in the de novo firms.
There was another behavioral feature present, where the de novo firms differed
from the old firms. It was in their relationships to labor experience and its remuneration.
The wage policy differences are depicted in Figure 3. Though there was a general trend
of increasing the wages until 20 years of working experience (i.e. proportionally to the
length of employment), the rise was faster in de novo firms. While in the public and the
privatized sector the wages did not decrease with age after 20 years of experience, in de
novo firms there was observed a sharp decrease is wages for workers with more than 30
years of experience. As it seems, the newly established firms remunerated higher the
younger experienced workers than the ageing workers. Also they paid to the recent
entrants into the labor market higher wages than it was in the privatized or public
enterprises. A similar conclusion is derived for Poland (see Winiecki, 2001, chapter 3)
and Hungary.
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        Wages
       Public sector and privatized firms
       De-novo firms
        10          20 30   40    years of experience
Figure 3: Wage policy in firms with different ownership
Source: according to Munich, Svejnar and Terrell, 1999.
7.3.  Comparison of SMEs with Large Enterprises
Unfortunately the statistics of Czech de novo firms have been very scarce and
we were obliged to take the whole SME sector as a proxy for quantifying their
approximate characteristics. Table 5 compares the size of SMEs in the Czech Republic
with EU and four other countries. Until 1990, the structure of Czech firms was
monopolistic and firms with less than 500 employees were scarce. Taken from historical
roots and similarities in factor endowments, the Czech structure of businesses should
converge to the Austrian structure. Austria is a country with exceptionally large number
of medium-sized firms and with low value added per worker in small firms. In another
words, Austrian small businesses (like in the United States) are highly labor-intensive
with low requirements of capital. This type of specialization would be advantageous for
Czech small firms because they have enormous difficulties with acquiring capital. That
is different from the SMEs in Belgium where the small firms are well endowed with
capital and their value added per employee is therefore larger than in large firms.
Table 5: The distribution of enterprises by size – comparison of SMEs in Czechia in
1998 with some OECD countries
Number of enterprises Number of employees Value added
Shares in %Country
1 - 99 100-499 500 + 0 - 99 100-499 500 + 0 - 99 100-499 500 +
USA 98.1 1.6 0.3 38.5 14.6 46.9 14.3 13.6 72.1
Japan 96.0 3.5 0.5 23.7 25.3 51.0 34.8 29.7 35.5
Belgium 98.9 0.9 0.2 45.4 19.5 35.1 54.4 18.6 27.0
Austria 86.1 12.1 1.8 40.6 36.0 23.4 27.4 36.4 36.2
Czechia 98.1 1.5 0.4 28.0 27.8 44.2 20.9 24.3 54.8
Eur. Union 98.9 0.9 0.2 53.3 16.2 30.5 50.0 21.4 28.6
Source: OECD, Meeting of the Industry Committee – Scoreboard of Indicators, Paris,
February 1998, p. 81 and the Czech Ministry of  Industry, 2000.
Data are for 1992, with the exception of USA (1993) and Czechia (1998).
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The tendency of SMEs to a more intensive labor usage was apparent in the
Czech Republic from early observations. First, the concentration of SMEs was biased to
industries which are labor intensive (clothing, textiles, wood processing, metal working,
glass, services). Second, the overall allocation of resources in all industries (i.e.
including the capital intensive ones) was biased to labor usage that substituted the
expensive new physical capital. There are five explanations of the latter:
a. SMEs have been largely established as de novo firms. Thus they could not
acquire capital by mere transfers from the SOEs that would be either free or
received at a discounted price (e.g. at the book value adjusted to depreciation).
b. The capital stock had to be acquired at free markets where the price of new
equipment and buildings was several times more expensive than was the price of
similar assets before 1991. It was their book value unadjusted for inflation that
was used as a base for the capital depreciation.
c. The bank credits to SMEs was either unavailable or the interest was often higher
than was the potential yield of investments.
d. The domestic wages in Euro and unit labor costs relative to main trading
partners were exceptionally low.
e. Wages in SMEs were less sticky than in the large firms. The competitiveness in
less efficient firms could be increased by lowering wages. It was the price that
had to be paid for job security (SMEs often functioned as a refuge from
unemployment).
The business structure in EU – outside the German speaking countries - is
dominated by small firms. The Czech Republic evidently does not fit in with European
patterns because of its over-grown large-sized business sector. It is a paradox that the
Czech structure of SMEs shows more similarities with the structure of firms in the US
and Japan, which operate on much larger domestic markets. There still remains a gap to
be filled by future expansion in either the medium firms (by 30%, to reach the level of
Austria) or the small firms (by 90%, to reach the  average level of the EU). In either
case, the expansion of SMEs must proceed at the expense of the shrinking large
business sector. The government industrial policies that after 1998 raised the previous
political obsession with large firms to a development fetish, is evidently an impediment
against the natural SME expansion.
At the same time the SME sector should be expected to change its structure.
Though its share on total Czech employment is not so much different from the advanced
countries, there is observed an over-employment in the very small firms. Especially it is
the case in the sole proprietorships that work on a part-time basis, often in parallel with
the employment at a full-time job. Such firms are not very productive and they may
mask the existence of a hidden unemployment. A similar tendency was found in
Hungary (Laki, 2001) where tax avoidance was one of the reasons.
Another aspect for uncovering the potential space of expansion of SMEs is in
comparing the present situation in the Czech Republic with that of Taiwan. Taiwan is an
industrially advanced country with approximately $18,000 per capita, whose
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development was overwhelmingly associated with SMEs. In 1998 the SME sector 24
employed 78% of the domestic work force. In 1987 it provided 67% of exports. Since
that time the share of exports declined to 47% in 1998, which is still significant. The
decrease was explained by a switchover of SMEs into the segment of large firms, some
of them even becoming international giants (see Cheng, 2000). Also the pressure of
rising wages and the shift to capital intensive production decreased the importance of
SMEs on total final sales to 31%. Taiwanese SMEs therefore function mainly as flexible
providers of intermediate goods and services to large enterprises. The most important
lesson from Taiwan is that SMEs are compatible with hi-tech and R&D.
The tendency to crowd-out the Czech corporate sector by the growth in the SME
sector was clearly evident throughout 1990-1997, which is confirmed in Tables 6a and
6b. The problems in the period 1997-99 can be also illustrated in Tables 7 and 8. In
Czechia in May 1997 there was a financial and political crisis, which was followed by a
restrictive package of measures. The recession ended in the middle of 2000. 1998
commenced with a harsh impact of the economic crisis on SMEs. Small firms were hit
first. Their recovery in the manufacturing (industrial) sector in 1999 was however very
fast, which is confirmed in the first line in Table 7. Unfortunately, in the same year
there was a crisis hitting the medium-sized firms (see Table 6a), which somehow
aggravated the total recovery 25.
We can see from Table 7 that SMEs in the trade sector were among the most
severely afflicted, losing in all indicators: employment, sales and the value added. At
the same time construction and transport underwent recession in sales and value added,
though they acquired a larger share on employment. Catering had downsized on its
labor and increased the sales and value added. Table 8 illustrates that during 1995-98
the industrial sector as a whole was stagnating and the decline of employment in large
firms was compensated by the growth in the SMEs. Nevertheless, the progress in the
SME sector was slowing down, especially after 1993, churning with impediments
coming both from the competition with large enterprises and from the government
policies. For example, the slow restructuring in the indigenous corporate sector caused
the retention of resources (labor, capital) in inefficient firms that could not be then used
in SMEs. On top of it, the survival of large firms was artificially backed by soft fiscal
policies, soft bank loans, bailouts and various revitalization schemes.
                                                
24
 In Taiwan the SME sector is defined by employment up to 200 workers in manufacturing and
construction, and up to 50 workers in the remaining sectors.
25
 Though we do not have the figures for 2000, the interim monthly reports indicate that the
industrial sector was recovering very fast after 1999, with the productivity rise reaching over
12% and SMEs becoming the most successful among the gaining sectors.
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Table 6a: Number of active firms in the Czech industrial sector
Year Number Structure by the number of employees
of firms 0-99 100-249 250-499 0-449 500 +
1993 n.a. n.a. 1296 n.a. 621
1995 101187 98823 1795 100618 569
1996 111255 108882 1818 110700 555
1997 146902 144407 1414 583 146404 498
1998 129288 126887 1406 536 128829 459
1999 (interim) 151157 148917 1292 535 150744 413
Source: Industrial statistics of Ministry of Industry and Trade, 1999
Table 6b: Employment structure in industrial sector  (number of employees in
thousands)
Structure by the number of employees
Year
Number of
employees 0-99 100-249 250-499 0-449 500 +
1993 n.a. 438 300 n.a. 1044
1995 1641 438 378 816 825
‘95 structure % 100% 26.7% 23% 49.7% 50.3%
1996 1613 473 373 846 767
1997 1659 547 220 200 967 692
1998 1582 529 220 187 936 646
‘98 structure % 100% 33.4% 13.9% 11.8% 59.2% 40,8%
Difference 1998-95 -59 91 29 120 -179
Index 1998/1995 96.4 120.8 107 114.7 78.3
Source: Industrial statistics of Ministry of Industry and Trade, 1999
Table 7:  Share of SMEs with employment up to 250 workers in all sectors of the Czech
economy, Comparison of 1999 with 1995
Employment Sales Value added
1995 1999 1995 1999 1995 1999
Industrial sector 43.1 45.6 33.9 36.6 34.0 37.2
Construction 75.2 76.7 70.3 69.3 74.5 74.1
Trade 85.7 81.9 90.8 87.1 88.5 85.3
Catering 90.8 86.7 85.4 85.8 77.1 80.2
Transport 19.5 22.9 43.7 41.7 29.9 27.3
Other services 82.2 83.8 87.8 88.7 84.2 86.2
TOTAL 64.4 59.1 52.9 53.5 57.4 53.0
 Sources: Own estimations for 1995 from industrial database of CSO and estimation of the
Ministry of Industry and Trade for 1999
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Table 8: Changes in the structure of employment in Czech industrial sector during 1995-98
              (The structure was computed as shares on total employment)
Changes in the structure of employment; 1998 - 1995
Total according to the size groups by employment
NACE category small: 0-99 medium:100-499 large: 500 +
All industrial sector 0.0 6.2 3.2 -9.4
including:
C - Mining and quarrying -0.9 1.2 0.0 -1.2
Mining of energy-producing
materials
-0.9 -0.7 1.5 -0.7
Other mining and quarrying 0.0 13.0 -17.6 4.6
D - Manufacturing industries 1.3 6.5 3.1 -9.6
Food and tobacco 1.0 3.8 -3.7 -0.1
Textile and clothing -1.1 5.8 1.7 -7.5
Leather and shoes -0.6 7.8 8.7 -16.5
Wood processing -0.4 2.0 3.1 -5.1
Paper and printing 0.2 10.6 -2.8 -7.8
Coke and petroleum refining -0.6 1.4 10.9 -12.3
Chemistry and pharmaceuticals 0.2 3.1 -0.6 -2.5
Rubber and plastics 0.9 7.7 4.6 -12.3
Glass and mineral products 0.4 3.1 0.1 -3.2
Metallurgy and metal products 0.4 9.0 6.1 -15.1
Machinery and equipment -0.9 8.2 4.5 -12.7
Electrical and optical equipment 1.4 3.7 2.9 -6.6
Cars and transport equipment 0.5 3.4 11.1 -14.5
Other manufacturing 0.0 14.9 -2.7 -12.2
E - Electricity,  gas and water -0.4 0.7 3.5 -4.2
Source: Industrial statistics of Ministry of Industry and Trade, 1999
The above problems are not transparent from the official statistics on the number
of firms in the Czech economy, as is shown in Table 9. In difference to Table 6a (where
there were reported only the active firms), Table 9 pinpoints the ever-growing number
of all firms registered, including those ones that reveal no activity. Such statistics, like
in Table 9, must be considered with utmost caution. The rising risk of financial default
in enterprises is illustrated by Figure 4 where the number of firms under judicial
bankruptcy and liquidation was sharply increasing since 1993. The trend reveals no sign
of attenuation. We can derive from the graph that out of 343 thousand firms registered
as legal entities only 1% of them is expected to be under bankruptcy procedure in 2001.
Approximately as many as that are firms liquidated by courts’ decision due to
insolvency but without a judicial supervision over the sales of their assets. On top of it
there are firms closing down voluntarily. Notwithstanding the problems the Czech
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authentic private businesses are challenged, the low number of bankruptcies among
them is an encouraging perspective.
Table 10 assesses the export and import performance of SMEs, as it was
estimated by Zemplinerova, 2000. It is a general trend that due to economies of scale
exports per employee increase with the size of the firm. Small firms are also
subcontractors for large firms that are intensive exporters. Even though this tendency is
also apparent in the Czech export pattern, with their 15% share on all manufacturing
exports the small firms up to 50 workers have been successful exporters. Their higher
share on imports (26%) is close to their share on total net output. We can see that even
small firms are potentially able to participate on the advantages of imports (e.g. the high
quality of inputs) and to take share on their externalities.
In Table 11 we compare productivities in SMEs and in large enterprises in 1998.
Because of the bias caused by higher capital/labor ratio in SMEs, an approximate
estimation of total factor productivity is added in addition to labor productivities. As
could be expected, Czech SMEs have productivity advantages in traditional industries
like leather, clothing and textiles. Unfortunately, these are declining industries. On the
other hand, SME reveal productivity advantages in some very progressive industries,
like optical instruments, rubber, plastics, machinery and transport equipment. As to the
total factor productivity comparison, SMEs show better performance in 13 out of 23
industries.
Table 9: Number of firms in the Czech economy 1991-99 (in thousands)
INDICATOR: 1991 1993 1996 1998 1999
All registered firms 179 1119 1469 1781 1963
       Self-employed n.a. n.a. 1104 1328 1426
* Legal entities 54 133 231 297 343
   * SOEs 3.5 3.3 1.9 1.3 1.2
   * Public enterprises n.a. n.a. 16 15 15
   * Private firms and corporations n.a. n.a. 169 218 260
        Firms with limited liability n.a. n.a. 131 165 188
        Firms with foreign owners n.a. n.a. 35 56 82
* Physical entities n.a. n.a. 1238 1484 1620
Firms in agriculture n.a. n.a. 121 128 130
  Firms in manufacturing n.a. n.a. 198 235 251
  Firms in construction n.a. n.a. 158 187 209
  Firms in trade n.a. n.a. 467 576 627
Source: Statistical Bulletin, Czech Statistical Office, Prague, 2000
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Figure 4: Number of bankruptcies declared by commercial courts
Source: Czech Ministry of Justice, 2001.
Remark: * The figure for 2001 is estimated. It is assumed that only a third of the 10580
existing  claims placed by creditors on bankruptcies will be approved by courts.
In 1999 nearly 50% of claims were approved for a bankruptcy liquidation. The
average duration of a bankruptcy court procedure was 18 months in 2000.
Table 10: Exports and imports in SMEs and in large manufacturing enterprises in 1998
Exports Share on total
exports
Imports Share on total
imports
Size of the firm
(by number of employees)
mil. CZK % mil. CZK %
         0 - 49 131 584 15.47 239 242 25.72
         50 - 249 176 768 20.78 214 958 23.11
         250 and more 539 928 63.48 473 189 50.88
      Total 850 529 100.00 930 042 100.00
SMEs 0-249 308 352 36.25 454 200 48.84
Source: Zemplinerova, 2000
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Table 11:  Comparison of productivities in SMEs and in large enterprises in 1998
(enterprises were classified according to the number of employees)
Value added per worker Total factor productivity *NACE Sector
SME 1-249 250 & more SME 1-249 250 & more
15 Food 314 400 55 62
16 Tobacco 211 2090 40 210
17 Textile 209 214 44 39
18 Clothing 175 178 51 50
19 Leather 141 123 35 32
20 Wood prod. 227 258 42 44
21 Paper 304 395 55 48
22 Printing 389 515 63 82
23 Oil processing 133 1231 -18 109
24 Chemistry 558 577 75 67
25 Rubber, plastics 356 353 68 57
26 Minerals processing 388 551 58 67
27 Metals 344 359 63 56
28 Metalworking 270 297 58 59
29 Machines 297 282 64 55
30 Computers 101 199 26 45
31 Electric machines 329 352 78 65
32 TV, radio 279 357 82 70
33 Optical instrum. 287 250 62 50
34 Cars & access. 341 434 53 66
35 Transport equip. 278 272 63 60
36 Furniture 185 254 53 50
37 Recycling 385 248 32 38
Source: Zemplinerova, 2000
* TFP was derived from a macroeconomic Cobb-Douglas production function estimated
as:
value added  / (number of employees 0.7  x book value of the physical capital 0.3 ). This is
too simplified and the results must be taken for rough orientation only.
8.  Institutional Barriers to Expansion of New Businesses
The present author was involved in a series of analyzes of SME performance in
Czechia during 1994-96. See Benacek, 1995 and 1997c, and Benacek, Zemplinerova,
1995 and 1996, for results of the study. Let us look now, 4 years after the last research,
how the situation has changed in the institutional environment.
In 1995 our list of main barriers to further evolution of small businesses
included:
a] ill-performing legal and judiciary systems;
b] problems with the capital acquisition;
c] intransparent and complicated fiscal system;
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d] rigidities on the labor market;
e] excessive regulation and bureaucracy infringing with independent decision-
making of  entrepreneurs.
These problems were generally accepted as socially contrived barriers at the
level of both the public discussion and the high politics. Practically all political parties
had some reference to the solution of the above problems in their election program. In
many aspects there were initiated serious attempts to dismantle the barriers at the level
of the government. The most important changes occurred in the first two items.
Ill-performing legal and judiciary systems
At the level of the legal system the convergence of Czech laws to the acquis
communautaire of the EU was a straight improvement, even though the present
negotiations for the EU accession still claim some large loopholes. Ostentatious fraud
and embezzlement of someone else’s property became a clearly identifiable crime
subject to concrete legal procedures. Therefore the cases of lawlessness and a massive
asset stripping were significantly reduced during 1997-2000. The opportunism of moral
hazard in running a business under a soft budget constraint has many negative impacts.
One of them is the spillover to the public finance in form of bail-outs, subsidies, soft
public procurement procedures and general corruption. This is a policy that has run very
low legal risks to this moment. As to the enforcement of law, the judicial system did not
change so dramatically in its quality. Czech law is based on the principles of “positive
law” where the absolute formal wording of the written code rules over the
interpretations of the justice issuing from the “natural law”. Though the speed of
litigation increased (from the average 3 years to 2 years), it was not sufficient enough. It
remained overburdened with tens of thousands of unsolved litigations and the attempts
to change the system from its core failed. Because of the life tenure (“definitiva” - that
the judges received in the meantime) and the lack of judges, the judicial lobby is now
difficult to change.
Since the enforcement of contracts at courts is a lump-sum transaction cost
invariant to the size of the litigating party, the small businesses are hit much harsher by its
ill performance. On the other hand, any improvement in this field would mean a built-in
stabilization step for the SMEs. Instead of calling for a discretionary industrial policy
actions in support of the SMEs, the main source of improvement should be seen primarily
in the global improvements in the functioning of the legislative, judiciary and legal
systems.
Capital acquisition
The performance of banks changed most dramatically during 1997-2001. At he
beginning of this period the presence of  private and especially foreign capital in Czech
banking was just symbolic. In July 2001 the last larger bank (Komercni Banka) that
remained in domestic hands was acquired by French Société Générale. After that, nearly
100% of the previously so controversial Czech commercial banking sector became
controlled by foreign strategic investors. With the inflation rate at 4% in 2001, the
interest on loans decreased to mere 7%. After privatization the banks became extremely
cautious in their credit policies. As a result, the majority of indigenous firms were cut
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off the credit lines. Those who were most harshly hit were the large firms without
foreign capital. As the competition among banks increased, some banks introduced
special schemes for credits to SMEs. We can say that, relatively to the large enterprises,
the SMEs have improved in their access to loans.
On the other hand, while the de-novo firms usually performed under well-
defined owners and safeguarded their property rights, the mass-privatized large firms
have acquired a much larger leeway for acquiring implicit subsidies from the
government. The deficit spending of the government of social democrats (in power
since 1998) increased to nearly 4% of the GDP. On top of it that very government was
very active in selling state banks and the state monopolies to foreign investors, the
proceeds from which were used for bailouts of large firms. While the bailouts for 1992-
98 were estimated to USD 11 billion, the Government announced plans for spending
additional USD 9 billion during 2001-03 in a new re-vitalization scheme for the
industrial sector. If such a plan passed through the Parliament it would further
strengthen the redistributive drive in the motivation of large firms and hamper the
competition between the SMEs and the large firms.
Fiscal Burden
The fiscal system and the taxation became a nightmare for small businesses. The
formal requirements are very complicated and subject to incessant amendments. The level
of taxation in the Czech Republic is high even by some West European left-wing
standards, redistributing in 2001 44% of the GDP. With practically no tax relief for the
heavily investing or the newly established SMEs, it is a mighty disincentive to run one’s
own business. The compulsory 48% social and health insurance levied on the gross
payrolls is another serious burden. After the three basic fiscal withdrawals (insurance,
income tax and VAT) are applied on the gross wages (i.e. on the labor costs of the
employer), the individual’s net purchasing power shrinks to 32% in the upper income
brackets (i.e. for incomes over approximately $ 3000 per month) or to 38% in the medium
income bracket. The remaining 68% (62% respectively) are channeled to the government
budget.
However, it is not only the taxes what makes the small-scale business activities
difficult. The intransparency and the bureaucracy of the fiscal system are often even more
demanding. Since they cannot hire specialists for individual tax agendas, many
entrepreneurs in the small businesses spend the majority of their time by studying the tax
laws and the endlessly changing regulations, consulting with the tax advisors, revising the
tax bills, checking the old accounting records, etc.
Tax evasion is a strong temptation for those small businesses that sell directly to
consumers or to foreign firms. The net "profit" can be thus increased approximately 2-3
times and the risk of being prosecuted is low. While the government SME support schemes
comprised approximately 30 billion CZK in the last 8 years, the tax evasion presented a
relief many-fold higher. Thus the tax evasion in the small businesses in transition became
their potentially most important instrument for the capital accumulation. Naturally, not
everyone is capable of using this instrument, even though the quest for survival presses
many entrepreneurs to use the tax evasion as a last resort for keeping in competition with
the less honest competitors. As a result, this unofficial (but tolerated) "scheme" for the
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promotion of small businesses punishes virtues and rewards vices, becoming one of the
least efficient arrangements, which could have been adopted.
Rigidities on the Labor Market
The devastation of the workers’ morale is one of the most damaging legacies of the
Communist past. The changes in the working discipline have proceeded slowly, especially
among older workers in large enterprises and in the government sector. Czech labor is also
characteristic for its extremely low mobility. The competition on the labor market is
therefore low and the de novo firms have a difficult position in acquiring workers even in
regions with high unemployment. The introduction of visa on migrant workers from
Eastern Europe in 2000 has further decreased the labor availability.
The race on the labor market for acquiring the workers with human capital, as
initiated by banks and foreign firms already in 1993, was accepted by the small businesses
and their wages in 1996 were by 16% higher than the average. However, after 1996 the
drive in SMEs for a staff with higher standards of the human capital has lost on its power
and the quest for human capital was won by enterprises owned by the foreign capital. It
seems evident that paying lower wages became a strategy for survival adopted by many
small firms. Though efficient in a short run, it may become counter-productive as a policy
for a long run development. The gap between the firms with FDI and the indigenous firms
will further widen if the latter would rely on less paid and less skilled workers. The Czech
economy will become a permanent two-speed economy where the fight for the shrinking
space for survival at low wages will proceed between the SMEs and the indigenous
corporate sector.
Bureaucracy and Regulation
By dealing with bureaucracy we have touched the central point where the Czech
ill-conceived institutional set-up spills over into the problems at the grass roots of
economy. The rise in the number of officials in the public sector has been unabated since
1989, as is shown in Table 12. Studies dealing with the conditions of entrepreneurship in
the Czech Republic point nearly unanimously that the following five barriers can be
treated as the most important:
• complicated system of the customs clearance,
• bureaucracy in the regulation of greenfield investments,
• regulation of the product innovation,
• all kinds of property registers (registers of land, real estates, firms, trade certificate, car
certificate);
• state health insurance scheme serving as an incentive for high absenteeism and low
efficiency.
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Table 12: Employment in the Civil Sectors of the Public Administration in Czechia
Sector 1990 1993 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Central government 1 n.a. 8761 8660 9841 10683 N/a N/a
   - 1993 = 100 % - 100 99 112 122 N/a N/a
Regional governments 1 n.a. 25216 31186 30891 31294 N/a N/a
   - 1993 = 100 % - 100 124 123 124 N/a N/a
Public administ. (army+police excl.) 2 95743 132675 161644 167917 175478 176959 177770
   - 1990 = 100 % 100 139 169 175 183 185 186
 Education 2 316807 323893 321601 321839 308612 304097 298272
Sources:  1data of Czech Statistical Office, special survey of 1998,
2 Statistical Yearbooks, Labor Statistics, 1997 and 2000 (p. 289)
It can be argued that the mentioned problems are universal to both small and large
enterprises. This idea is false. The above problems are usually encountered as fixed
transaction costs which are not proportional to the size of the firm (Molitor, 1995). It was
estimated in the USA that the cost of the administrative regulation represents 8-9% of the
GDP. Stein, Hopkins and Vaubel, 1995, presume that the West European losses due to
regulation are higher than in the USA. We can thus assume that the situation in the
traditionally bureaucratic Czech Republic must be even less favorable than in the EU and
its small firms are challenged with more obstacles than in the majority of developed
industrial economies.
The proposed improvement in the public administration can be seen in the
abandoning of the extensive prescriptive legislation, targeted at means, and its superseding
by the legislation targeted at objectives. Instead of paternalizing of who, what, how, when
and where one must (or must not) do, the new liberal regulation commences with the list of
objectives and the choice of means is to a large extent left on the incumbent economic
agents. Unfortunately the Czech tradition in the public administration has its roots in the
authoritative bureaucracies of the Habsburg monarchy, Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia.
Though there were many positive changes on the way for dismantling the institutions of
central planning, the Czech public administration has "recovered" recently from the shock
of "anarchy" of 1989-93 and re-gained some of its former Kafkaesque features, conflicting
with the management of a performing market system.
The performance of the government, bureaucracy and the inflated taxation and
budget spending will remain the most important burdens to entrepreneurial dynamism in
this country. The entry into EU will have a positive effect in this respect because the
European Commission is a much less bureaucratic institution if compared with the present
Czech state of affairs.
9.  Potential Challenges to Generic Private Sector in the Long
Run
Figure 5 describes the present and the expected long-term developments in the
Czech economy. The graph is based on comparing the costs of production with sales
(output). The downward sloping lines represent alternative unit-value isocost functions
C:
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K = - (w/r) L + B/r
for a budget B = 1 mil Korunas where K, L are capital and labor used,
w = wages and r = rental of capital.
Y = convex Cobb-Douglas unit-value isoquants of production (in value added)
functions for three types of commodity groups:
a/ capital intensive (“machines”),
b/ rather labor intensive (“textiles”),
c/ non-traded commodities that are highly labor intensive.
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Figure 5: The position of production in SMEs after the tightening of budget constraint if
both labor and capital costs converge to factor price levels of the EU due to FDI
inflows
The set of rays originating at zero point represent their average capital per labor
requirements. Since the majority of Czech generic private firms are concentrated among
the labor intensive industries, we show also the “cone of de novo firms” that covers non-
traded sector and a part of  “textiles”.
Thick C0 isocost line represents a cost benchmark as was set by the process of
transformation around 1999. The wages were low (1/6 of the average EU wages – see
the distance between 1/w0 and 1/weu) while the cost of capital (r) was approximately by
50% higher than in the EU what is depicted by the distance between points 1/r0 and
1/reu. The isoquants of restructured indigenous firms should be tangent to the isocost C0,
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similarly like Y0nt. Nevertheless, not all Czech firms were restructured at that time.
Some production isoquants were hanging well above C0, like that of Y0mach. That firm
was wasting its substance, being on a verge of its exit. Its survival is possible only if
both its wages and its capital returns are very low, as depicted by isocost Cexit. Thus
indigenous firms have their isoquants located in the space between C0 and Cexit.
As the transformation draws nearer to its close (for example in 2000-2005), the
indigenous firms are challenged by imports from the EU (their isoquants are tangent to
Ceu) and by technically superior domestic firms with foreign owners (tangent to Cfdi).
The cost of capital becomes the same as in EU. Foreign and the successfully
restructured indigenous firms raise the real wages to 1/wcz 26 and the cost benchmark
moves to Ccz. The indigenous firms that did not restructure in time will be challenged by
bankruptcy. The generic private sector will be both relieved and burdened with the new
situation. On one hand this sector will adjust most easily in the non-traded industries.
With no competition from imports its prices could increase 27 and its isoquant Ycznt
would shift down until it becomes tangent to Ccz. This will be the situation in many
SMEs in services.
The stabilized enterprises in capital-intensive industries will be significantly
relieved, as the isoquant tangent to Ccz lies higher than the original one that is tangent to
C0. Indigenous industries in the labor intensive internationally competing industries will
be most harshly hit. The labor cost will become too high and a new round of
restructuring will be required. As an escape strategy, the labor intensive manufacturing
industries could avoid a full adjustment in their wages, becoming a niche for poorly
paid workers (e.g. the non-permanent vagrant workers from abroad). Their unit-value
isocost line will shift to Csurv. It is questionable if such a survival strategy could be
viable once Czech foreign policy built barriers to the immigration of cheap labor from
Eastern Europe.
The realism of these changes in competitiveness may be signaled by a change in
strategies of FDI which became recently more attracted by capital intensive industries
and by investments into labor intensive service sector operating in non-traded products
(see Benacek and Visek, 2000). In the manufacturing sector the already restructured
enterprises active in capital intensive industries will get an additional impetus for
growth while the firms active in labor intensive manufacturing industries, i.e. where the
de novo firms had initially favorable conditions, will be challenged with new hardships
as the labor will become too expensive. Thus we cannot expect that the build-up of the
de novo firms has been recently stabilized in all sectors of the Czech economy.
                                                
26
 The wages in terms of Euros will more than double. That can happen either by nominal
increases in wage rates (under constant exchange rate) or by mere real appreciation of exchange
rate. That also means that the existing differences between nominal GDP per capita (e.g. in
Euro) and GDP per capita in purchasing parity will be eliminated. The decrease will be from the
existing ERDI factor of 2.4 to unity.
27
 The shift of the isoquant Y0nt along the K/L ratio from the tangent point on C0 to the position
of Ycznt tangent with Ccz will require approximately a 60% price increase, what is quite realistic
in the present situation when the price of Czech services is often a half or one third of the EU
prices.
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10.  Policy implications and conclusions
The main findings in the paper can be summarized up in the following list of
conclusions:
• The long-lasting problems of the Czech economy, which became apparent at least
since 1996, have their roots in the behavior of a significant part of the domestic
enterprise sector.
• These problems were called into being by a very intensive, nevertheless deeply non-
standard mass privatization and the negative externalities it had on the behavior of
economic agents and institutions throughout the Czech economy.
• The authentic (generic) private sector cannot be based on a command coming from
the upper hierarchies of the social organization. It can arise only from gradual acts
at the level of economic agents making their decisions autonomously at the grass
roots of the economy.
• Soft market environment set by the Czech mass privatization policies was counter-
productive for the development of entrepreneurial activities as defined by
Schumpeter. It also did not remove the soft budget constraint in a large part of the
domestic firms.
• The lobbies of pressure groups, defending the privileges of former socialist
corporations, became dominant in shaping Czech politics, fiscal and banking
economic policies and the build-up of economic institutions. The authentic private
sector that evolved mainly from small and medium-sized enterprises was driven
from its start to a position of an outsider.
• Notwithstanding the lack of government support, market imperfections,
bureaucracy and failing judiciary, the sector of newly established businesses has
shown a high degree of viability and at the end of 90s it became a dominant player
on the market side of the Czech economy.
• The future of the Czech economic development cannot be separated from the
situation in both the enterprises under foreign ownership and the small and medium-
sized firms under indigenous owners. The co-operation between these two healthy
segments of the Czech economy the can strengthen if the spillovers from the
foreign-owned large firms increase the competitiveness of the indigenous sector.
• In many aspects mass privatization not only fails to improve the performance of the
frail emerging markets in transition – it can even break down its evolving
institutions.
• Past merits of mass privatization should be subject to a fundamental overhauling on
both the academic and the economic policy sides. The quality of privatization
matters and the lesson of the “super-fast” Czech privatization points to many
dangers which mass privatization techniques can bring into life and entrench them
for a long time in the development of institutional frameworks.
• The economic policy-making should be more instrumental in providing more
support for the requirements of these two progressive segments of the Czech
authentic private sector.
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• The main fields for support are expected to be in the less bureaucratic public
administration, customs, investment deregulation, investment fiscal relief, support
of the information and transport infrastructure and further improvements of the
business legislation and property rights enforcement.
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APPENDIX A: Role of SMEs in Increasing the Contestability and
Efficiency of Imperfect Markets
        P
    D2SME       D1SME
    Pc0
    Pc1
           
AC1           MCc
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    Pc3         AC2
         E
        Dtotal
         MR
   qf1       Qc       Q
18% share
30% share
Figure A1: Price and market share competition between a cartelized oligopoly and a
SME fringe competitors and the reason for SME industrial policy
support
Cartel c acts first as a rent-seeking monopoly charging price Pc0. With this price
given, fringe competitors f (a set of SMEs) can enter the market. First they occupy a
niche depicted by average cost curve AC1  and get a marginal share (18%) of the market
by selling at qf1. Firms f, operating on a fringe left by the monopoly, always behave like
a price taker, adjusting their price to what the cartel charges. That is why we do not
follow a Cournot game principle in our analysis 28. The 18% market share of SMEs
means that fringe can “bite-off” 18% of the total demand curve D that first belonged
fully to the oligopoly. SMEs, however, cannot sell at price below the minimum of the
AC1 curve, so from all prices lower than that the total demand belongs fully to the
cartel. Nevertheless, cartel must adjust the price due to SME competition. Though the
price setting remains all the time subject to the point of MR and MC intersection at E,
the kink on the total demand, due to the existence of D1SME, will press the cartel to
decrease the price to Pc1.
                                                
28
 Maybe we should reinterpret this model by using Cournot strategies but the SMEs would then
become a part of the market power game. That is not very typical for SMEs since there is a
problem of their capacity to act in collusion. Their large number and individual smallness offer
many reasons for difficult co-ordination and easy deflection.
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If the fringe competitors succeed in expanding their production by investment,
they could shift their average cost curve to AC2. The outsiders from SMEs so become
serious players on the market by taking 30% of the market share. At that moment
another round of price adjustments must be introduced. As the price falls to Pc2 the
cartel will still sell at Qc but its monopoly power is seriously undermined. However, if
the cartel decides to cut the price to Pc3 or below (what would be a predatory dumping
policy) then the fringe competitors would go to bankruptcy. In that case the only way
how to uphold the fringe competitors and with them the consumer welfare is either to
provide a subsidy to SMEs or to levy a fine to the monopolist for an illicit predatory
practice violating the laws of fair market competition. Industrial policy supporting the
SMEs can be a very important instrument of market contestability, production
efficiency and consumer welfare.
The following conclusions can be derived from our model:
• The position of SMEs is very weak if the domestic industry is dominated by a cartel
and the scale economies are important.
• It is very important what is the size of the domestic market. In case of a small
country the existence of a monopoly (or cartel) and a low contestability are
probable. With it we can expect higher inefficiency and deadweight losses in a
small country.
• The enlargement of the market (e.g. by the entry into the EU) will hurt both f and c
on domestic market if the contestability would rise and the price would fall bellow
Pc3. However, if the price in EU will be at least at Pc3, the EU enlargement can be a
favorable event for the domestic industry.
• The entry of a small firm into the market is very risky because at the market share
of qf1 even a small price decrease can endanger its viability.
• The entry of a small firms is more probable if the sunk fixed costs (e.g. the capital
expenditure) is not large. That means the SMEs are more probable to exist in labor
intensive industries.
• SMEs can be more competitive if they are able to adjust the wages to their standing
of competitiveness vis-à-vis the large competitors.
• The expansion of SME is risky if it is subject to capital investment financed by
bank credit lines. It would be a moral hazard of the bank to lend to a SME, once the
price war (a decline below the minimum of AC) can be envisaged.
• A cautious industrial policy to SMEs can be justified in three ways:
- in supporting the credits to SMEs (e.g. in mediating the guarantees and
subsidies to interest payments),
- in lowering the transaction costs of SMEs by which the average costs decrease
and allow the SMEs to survive downward price fluctuations,
- in controlling the fair competition on the market.
• The industrial policy supporting SMEs can lead to net social gains since the cost of
the intervention is lower than the benefits (in price decreases) that viable SMEs
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bring to the society. It will also increase the competition leading to long-term aims
at bringing technical efficiency improvements and lowering of prices to customers.
• The moral hazard associated with policy supports of SMEs can also lead to
lobbyism and abuses of such policies. The strategic policy is justified only on
account of market failures. If they are not evidently present, the Government
support of SMEs is a wrong policy.
• The argument in favor of the policy support of SMEs is in fact a variant of the
Brander-Spencer model of strategic trade applied on government intervention in
cases of export promotion on imperfect markets. See Brander and Spencer, 1985, or
Brander, 1986, for more details.
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APPENDIX B:  Empirical Evidence Provided by the World Bank
Study
(Tables and figures here see Selowsky, Mitra et al., 2001)
Sources: World Bank database on SMEs
AS Figure B1 shows, the leading position of the Czech indigenous
entrepreneurship froze to a stagnation after 1995. It was in that year when large mass
privatized enterprises entered a stage of the “third wave of privatization” which was
characterized by asset stripping and a possibility to exploit numerous other implicit
subsidies (unpaid bills, taxes, social and health insurance, privatization installments;
soft bank loans, etc), which artificially raised the competitiveness of the large firms. At
the same time the employment in the Czech small enterprises retained its slowly rising
trend. Thus the development in SMEs after 1995 shows signs of depletion of
entrepreneurial vigor, as the barriers to SME development were rising and the large
firms were crowding-out the space for SME expansion.
Figure B1: Share of Value Added in Small Enterprises 
(Firms with 50 employees or less)
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Table B1 points to a fact that labor productivity in small enterprises in nearly all
transition countries is larger than in the rest of the economy. In Czechia it was still by
9.9% higher than in enterprises with more than 50 employees, notwithstanding the
stagnation in 1996-98. We should also keep in mind that small firms had to compete
with a substantial sector of foreign firms where productivity was significantly higher
than the average. Small firms are also more labor intensive, as their access to capital
was limited. That naturally decreases the productivity of labor at the expense of gains
received from the saved physical capital.
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Table B1: Employment and Valued Added in Small Enterprises, 1998
(Average for all enterprises = 100%)
% SMEs Employment Value Added VA per Employee
HUNGARY 96.1% 54.9% 63.6% 115.8%
POLAND 92.1% 45.7% 54.4% 118.9%
CZECH REP. 97.0% 48.7% 53.5% 109.9%
LITHUANIA 97.4% 55.1% 55.3% 100.4%
LATVIA 91.2% 45.5% 50.4% 110.9%
GEORGIA 88.6% 39.6% 39.3% 99.2%
KAZAKHSTAN 88.6% 15.6% 22.4% 143.6%
UKRAINE 69.2% 16.9% 30.0% 177.5%
RUSSIA 56.3% 18.6% 23.0% 123.7%
BELARUS 37.7% 15.9% n.a. n.a.
Note: Firms with 50 employees or less.            Sources: The World Bank database on SMEs
As Figure B2 points out, the labor productivity of Czech small businesses reaches only
56% of the average level of the EU. That is slightly less than what was the gap between
the Czech GDP per capita at purchasing power parity and the EU average
(approximately 60%). The lead over the Hungarian productivity by 23% is,
nevertheless, a success.
Figure B2: Comparison of productivity in small enterprises with EU
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Source: World Bank database on SMEs
While the left-hand scale of Figure B3 depicts the cycle of Czech GDP, the
right-hand scale describes the share of value added and employment in small firms on
the total statistics. The exponential growth of production is small firms evident since
1992 was sharply constrained at the end of 1995 when the “third way” of privatization
started to crowd out the resources for the SME development. Though the employment in
small firms continued until 1998, its productivity was declining. The further
development of SMEs received serious blows in 1997-99 and its partial recovery
happened only in 2000.
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Figure B3: GDP, value added and employment in small firms (< 50 employees)
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